90 



Mr. Fraser. Mr, Chairman, I wonder if our witness might point to 

 the map and some of the lines that would be of interest to the United 

 States. They are not too easily seen here, so if you could actually 

 point — you might reemphasize again what those lines represent. 



Mr. Christy. Yes, this actually is on the basis of the Geneva Con- 

 vention; as I said, there are other ways in which the seas might be 

 divided. Under the Geneva Convention, islands have the same rights 

 as coastal states do. It is on this basis that lines have been drawn. For 

 example, you take this line off the U.S. shore in the Atlantic. This 

 point along here is equal in distance between the closest point of the 

 coast of the United States and of Bermuda. 



The Bahamas lie down here, so the line goes in close to our shores. 



Clipperton Island is a small desolate rock belonging to France, 500 

 miles south of Mexico. This acquires vast territory in the eastern 

 Pacific. Other systems might be developed for dividing up the oceans 

 of the world but they all run into certain difficulties. 



If we could eliminate the isla^nds this would raise questions as to 

 what rights would attach to Hawaii and to the Aleutians. 



I think that the main difficulty with this system is that the Soviets 

 would gain such little territory, and this would make such a regime 

 very difficult to get accepted in international law. 



In addition, I would think that the U.S. Navy would tend to reject 

 this kind of a division of the sea floor. Even though it may be simply 

 for minerals and the right to exploit the minerals, it might eventually 

 lead to restrictions on the mobility we value so highly for security and 

 defense. 



The third approach is a flag nation approach, and this is essentially 

 a temporary solution. Under this kind of situation the nation guar- 

 antees protection of its individual exploiter wherever he chooses to 

 operate. 



This might lead to a headlong race to claim rights by various nations 

 unless certain international rules were established. International rules, 

 such as performance requirements, for example, would mean that 

 rights can only be held so long as the exploiter is producing. Such con- 

 trols might have the effect of preventing the less developed countries 

 from participating, and there would be a question as to whether or not 

 this would be acceptable. 



Also, there is the question raised by this system of how you allocate 

 resources where conflicts occur. The minerals on the sea floor are not 

 uniformly valuable. There are certain sites which are far more valua- 

 ble than others and these are the sites where conflict will develop. 

 If there is competition or conflict for the same site, how do you resolve 

 it under this kind of system ? 



Eventually I think, therefore — and those who have advocated the 

 flag nation approach feel this is inevitable — there will have to be some 

 form of international solution. 



This leads to the fourth alternative — an international solution — for 

 which there is actually a range of nlternatives. One extreme might have 

 the United Nations operating and digging up the resources. I do not 

 think this is at all desirable. 



The other might be simply an international registration office and 

 I think this has drawbacks as well. But some international solution 



