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The second dispute deals with the right of a coastal state to exercise juris- 

 diction over fisheries adjacent to its coast. Broadly speaking, all fishermen 

 (and their sovereigns) wish the right to fish everywhere without restrictions, 

 but they do not want their competitors to have the same right. Two natural 

 circumstances help to fog the dispute. 



Danger of overfishing 



The first is that each stock of fish is capable of being overfished, to the detri- 

 ment of all. In numerous instances, unregulated fishing effort has had this effect. 

 Accordingly, to preserve stocks to the benefit of all, fishing effort on any species 

 must be regulated so that it will not exceed that level corresponding to the 

 maximum sustainable yield. 



Secondly, the living resources of the sea are migratory. They move across 

 boundaries according to their biological needs and not by the desires of man. 

 No boundaries in the sea can describe their multitudinous and diverse migratory 

 patterns, and fishes cannot thrive and multiply without this freedom of move- 

 ment. 



The first of these natural circumstances yields two practical problems — con- 

 servation, and the division of the profits arising from conservation. The matter 

 of conservation was rationalized in the Convention on Fishing & the Conserva- 

 tion of the Living Resources of the High Seas by providing a mechanism for 

 dealing with the conservation of fish stocks through international agreements, 

 and a mechanism for resolving disputes. 



This took care of part of the problem. But it left the second part — the division 

 of profits arising from conservation practices among the nations — to separate 

 ad hoc agreements among them, as it had been formerly, for the plain reason 

 that no universal solution had been reached beyond the phrase "reasonable use." 



One way that a nation can resolve the problem selfishly is to extend its exclu- 

 sive jurisdiction to exclude foreign fishermen from the use of the resources 

 found there. The weaker fishing countries always have tried to do this — from 

 the Middle Ages to the present time. Strong fishing nations have, at the same 

 time, resisted these efforts. 



The U.S. has been, and is, on the sharp horns of this dilemma. As a strong 

 sea power, it wishes to keep the high seas as broad as possible in order to 

 exercise its power with maximum flexibility. It is a weak fishing power, however, 

 and the weak elements of its fishing industry continually press it to extend its 

 jurisdiction farther to sea to reduce competition from foreign fishermen. 



Trading fish for security 



Obviously, military security must supervene. During the 1958 and 1960 con- 

 ferences on the law of the sea, the U.S. exercised the stratagem of trading 

 fishery rights when necessary to win votes for a narrow territorial sea. 



But other nations, and particularly small ones among its military allies, have 

 great need for access to the food of the sea and assumed that the U.S. would 

 protect them militarily but not necessarily commercially. 



Accordingly, the military and the fishing interests in territorial limits, and 

 in jurisdiction over fishing in the high seas, become so confused that it was 

 impossible to give enough fish away to win the votes required to resolve the 

 military problem. 



The 1960 conference gave some pause to these disputes as adjustment in 

 international practice was made by the nations to a formula that had been 

 proposed by the U.S. and had won nearly enough votes. This formula envisioned 

 a territorial sea 3 to 6 miles wide, plus enough extra fishery jurisdiction to allow 

 exclusive fishing rights in a zone extending 12 miles offshore. 



The diplomatic and military establishments of the U.S. government never 

 have understood why the fishery and territorial sea issues could not be dealt 

 with separately. The sea fisheries are not an important part of U.S. economy, 

 but military security is. It is not understood that in other nations having a vote 

 in the UN these interests are in closer balance. 



Accordingly, the policies followed by the U.S. in the law-of-the-sea confer- 

 ences have led to a steady erosion of the 3-mile territorial sea toward the 12- 

 mile limit, which was just what the diplomatic and military establishments 

 wished to avoid. 



To all intents and purposes, the U.S. has lost this key battle, although the 

 argument will persist. The Navy has enough firepower to reverse the decision, 

 but the government will not let it pull the trigger. 



The whole subject has been brought to white heat again in the international 

 field by two actions again instituted by the United States. 



