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domestic minerals regime this power has been found necessary. It is exercised 

 in a variety of ways. The public lands which are open to mining occupancy may 

 be withdrawn by Executive Order or legislation. Some are withdrawn perma- 

 nently because of inconsistency of mining with other uses, e.g., National Parks, 

 some power sites, Indian reservations. Some are withdrav/n temporarily, to pre- 

 serve resources in aid of legislation. Some are withdrawn from some kinds of 

 activities, but not others, e.g., the oil shale lands are withdrawn from mining 

 location and oil shale leasing, but not from oil and gas leasing. Each case of with- 

 drawal expres.ses a Governmental judgment thnt a particular kind of mineral ex- 

 ploitation in a de.signated area must yield to other interests considoi-ed more im- 

 portant, for a time, or permanently. It is a process of balancing vnlues and choos- 

 ing among them, and it is an inescapable one for a landlord who is administering 

 a trust for others. 



The regime of seabottom land stewardship will have to make similar bnlnnces. 

 There will be comi'.etition between mineral development, surface and undersea 

 navigation, submarine pipelines and cables, fishing, recreation, pollution control, 

 military exercises, and scientific inquiry. 



Thus at the threshold consideration will have to be given to the amount of 

 di.scretion to be vested in the new landlord of the sea, and the amount to be 

 reserved for future agreement. Basic policy questions are involved. For exam- 

 ple, would the landlord be authorized to close from mineral development areas 

 used for missile ranges, or conver-ely, to permit development in areas currently 

 used for missile ranges? Would the landlord have authority to permit, or to pre- 

 vent, develo})ment in traditional fishing areas? 



Related to the withdrawal question is the problem of allocation of the sea floor. 

 In our law allocation is also handled in several ways. In the vast public domain 

 open to mining location for siich minerals as gold, silver, copper, lead and sine, 

 the resource, for a fixed acreage, is given to the one who makes the discovery, 

 occupies the site, and extracts the mineral. The discoverer gets the minerals free 

 of -rent, royalty or other payment to the Government and also has the oppor- 

 tunity to purchase the fee, at nominal prices. 



Certain other minerals, including oil, gas, sulphur, sodium and potassium, may 

 be recovered only by obtaining a lease. There are several leasing methods. On 

 the uplands, on wildcat locations, the lease goes to the first applicant, and an 

 elaborate lottery system is used in the very fi'eqtient cases of simultaneous filing 

 of applications. The royalty is 12Vi percent of value of minerals produced. If the 

 land contains a known geologic structure, in a producing oil and gas field, leases 

 are obtained by cash bonus competitive bidding. There is also a royalty on 

 production. 



On the Outer Continental Shelf a competitive leasing system is used, with 

 leases going to the high cash bonus bidder, who must also pay a royalty on 

 production. 



The so-called common variety minerals such as sand and gravel are disposed 

 of by sale of the material only, leaving the land in federal ownership. 



Any study of proposals for an international landlord of the seabottom will 

 have to consider first whether allocations should be made to nations, for sub- 

 allocation by them, or directly to those who will do the developing. 



If the decision is to allocate directly, then consideration will have to be given 

 the extent to which the allocation choices should be delegated to the interna- 

 tional body, or spelled out in advance, or reserved for future agreement. 



An element of this decision will be the question of acreage limitation policy. 

 All the United States mining and leasing laws spell out the maximum acreage 

 per claim or lease. In addition there are in some cases limitations on total acre- 

 age which one person or firm may hold. The purposes of these limitations are 

 to prevent monopolization of the resources and speculative holdings. 



Here too the initial question will be how much authority should be delegated 

 to the international body. But whoever is given the authority will necessarily 

 have to develop a firm base of information to avoid drawing area limits so small 

 as to be uneconomic, or so large as to permit speculators to tie up large areas 

 and thereby usurp the power to dispose of the resources. 



These then are some, but by no means all. of the questions of resource man- 

 agement inherent in proposals to vest title in an international body. The solu- 

 tion will require the best efforts of the keenest minds that can he assembled. 

 Representatives of the American Bar Association, possibly through cooperative 

 efforts with representatives of the bars of other countries, could make valuable 

 contributions to this endeavor. 



