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modify these rights in order to prevent excessively rapid output from a coimnon 

 pool. Again, it would be desirable to have more knowledge about the rights that 

 an exploiter would require, but it does not seem that the absence of such 

 knowledge need prevent the establishment of some high seas regime. 



The third question relates to the speed with which international law can be 

 formulated to meet the requirements placed upon it. One of the arguments 

 that has been advanced against the establishment of an international regime 

 (and I would guess that this would have to apply to any regime) is that a 

 regime is not necessary; that after the conflict or controversy emerges, inter- 

 national law can respond quickly enough to resolve the conflict through the 

 formulation of the necessary rules. This, it seems to me, depends upon the 

 prize that's at stake and upon how nations anticipate obtaining a share of the 

 prize. I would doubt that nations could reach speedy decisions on such an issue 

 as the division of the wealth of the seas. Certainly no speedy decision has been 

 reached on the width of the territorial sea. In view of this, it seems to me that 

 we oannot rely on a speedy and satisfactory evolution of international law, but 

 must plan now for the eventualities of the future. 



The final question is how a future regime would be affected and shaped by 

 developments occurring before a regime is established. That is, if we postpone 

 the establishment of a regime, will we find ourselves locked into an undesir- 

 able position because of the pressures stimulated by the initial developments? 

 The answer to this question is obviously speculative. I would guess that it would 

 depend, in part, upon where the pioneer development takes place and by whom. 



If, for example, the pioneer effort takes place within the range of what a 

 coastal state conceives to be its interest, that state may attempt to establish its 

 interest by advocating a "national lakes" approach. In further speculation, if 

 that state is one of the less developed nations, it may be joined in its advocacy 

 by many others. If these pressures are successful, and a "national lakes" regime 

 is adopted, the result, as pointed out later, is not likely to be either desirable 

 or viable over the long run. 



Other speculations might lead to different results, depending upon how one 

 plays this game. But what is important is not the speculations but the awareness 

 that a. "wait and see" approach may lead us into a situation that we would find 

 detrimental and difficult to change. It could, of course, have an opposite effect 

 and result in a desirable regime. But the outcome is unclear, and not likely to 

 be influenced by wishful thinking. 



In reviewing the pros and cons of the "wait and see" approach, it appears to me 

 that it would be neither desirable nor necessary to await the development of a 

 sea mining enterprise. The absence of a regime is, I believe, a significant deterrent 

 to exploitation. A regime can be established on the basis of present information. 

 To delay the establishment until development takes place will be to leave the 

 decision in the hands of chance. We should begin now to formulate the law, to set 

 forth the ground rules, and to work towards the establishment of the best regime 

 possible. There is an urgent and immediate need for constructive, open discussion 

 of the various alternatives. 



NATIONAL LAKE 



Of these alternatives, the national lake or coastal state approach has a great 

 deal of superficial appeal. The exploitability criterion of the Convention on the 

 Continental Shelf opens the way for appropriating larger and larger areas of 

 the sea bottom adjacent to our coasts. By accepting or asserting this convention 

 as a valid guide for the deep seas we could extend our jurisdiction across the 

 sea bottom until we reach a point midway between our shores and those of an 

 opposite coastal state. The attraction to the U.S. is that we have long coa.stUnes 

 on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and tlie Gulf of Mexico. 



There are some advantages to dividing up the bottom of the sea among the 

 coastal states. This regime would permit each state to lease and protect ex- 

 clusive rights to the resources within its area. Each coastal state could extend 

 its administrative techniques out to deep water, permitting as rapid or as slow a 

 development as it deemed economical. If it did not care to exploit tlie resources 

 itself, it could lease rights to foreign companies and extract a royalty inr'ome. 

 This solution, at least on the surface, appears clean and easy. But there are 

 some major drawbacks. 



The drawbacks can best be illustrated by examining a map of the world. 

 Islands play a particularly important role in this examination, because of their 



