240 



strategic location off the coasts of the continents. According to the continental 

 shelf convention, islands have the same rights as mainlands, and, indeed, it is 

 difficult to see how they could be excluded. Thus, the French and the British 

 would be among the chief beneficiaries of the national lake approach. The 

 French would receive a vast area of the Indian Ocean because of Kerguelen, 

 Crozet, and other islands. And they also would get a large area of the eastern 

 tropical Pacific, in part because of Clipperton Island, a desolate rock l.ving 

 about 500 miles southwest of Mexico. To the British would go more than half 

 of the South Atlantic Ocean, because of Ascension, St. Helena, Tristan da 

 Cunha, and South Georgia. A large share of the North Atlantic including part 

 of the Blake Terrace would fall to the Briti.sh because of Bermuda and the 

 Bahamas. The trust territories of the South Pacific would be virtually impossible 

 to divide. 



The British and the French might find the national lakes approach very 

 attractive, but what about the other powerful nations? The U.S. would win a vast 

 section of the North Pacific, but at the same time, it would find its freedom to 

 operate in all oceans to be severely restricted. Chapman points out that special 

 purpose rights tend to become generalized — that jurisdiction for one use tends 

 toward full sovereignty.* Thus jurisdiction over the bottom may extend upwards 

 through the superjacent waters, and the fish therein, to the surface waters, until 

 all seas become territorial seas. Even if that doesn't happen, U.S. firms, to 

 operate outside of their own waters, would have to deal with a multitude 

 of coastal states. Unlike either of the other two regimes, their investments would 

 be subject to expropriation and their revenues to increa.sed royalties. 



More significantly, perhaps, the national lakes approach would i)rovide virtual- 

 ly no gains to the Soviet Union, other than a .small slice of the Northwest 

 Pacific and the Barents Sea and Artie Ocean. It is inconceivable that the Soviets 

 would agree to a regime that would give them so little and the rest of the world 

 so much. And without their agreement, no regime would be viable. Thus, while 

 there are some superficial attractions to the national lakes approach and while 

 it would provide for economically efficient exploitation, it is most unlikely that 

 such a regime would ever become adopted. 



FLAG NATION KEGIME 



The two remaining alternatives, the fiag nation and international regimes, 

 are the most important. The flag nation approach bears some similarity to the 

 wait and see approach, on the one hand, and to the international regime, on 

 the other. It appears to be mid-way between the two in terms of time ; i.e., 

 between the short and the long run solutions. Ely suggests that "until enough 

 international competition and friction develop to justif.v creation of some advance 

 licensing scheme for administration by the United Nations, recognition of the 

 flag of the craft or other surface mechanism from which the exploration is 

 controlled, sufficiently identifies the jurisdiction which ought to have plenary 

 control over that exploration and over the exploitation of the resources so 

 discovered." " In short, the flag nation approach appears to be simply an inter- 

 mediary step between no regime and some form of international regime. It 

 may, however, be much more than that since it is likely to have a quite different 

 effect on the distribution of the seas' wealth than would occur under an 

 international approach. 



The flag nation approach would presumably permit the exploiter to operate 

 under the protection of the nation whose flag he flies. The exploiter might be 

 an individual firm, a consortium, a mixed public-private enterprise, or a govern- 

 ment itself. But in each case the government would be responsible for the 

 assertion and maintenance of the claim of the exploiter. In Ely's words, "the 

 explorer . . . appropriates a .segment of the .seabed, and the jurisdiction — let 

 us go further and say sovereignty — of his flag attaches to the discovery." " 

 If the respective governments are willing to guarantee this protection, and the 

 exploiter feels that the guarantee will be effective over a suflicient length of 

 time, then one of the major deterrents to exploitation will become insignificant. 



As development occurs under these guarantees, there will eventually he con- 

 flict and competition for the same resource area. If the competition is between 



* Chapman, op. clt.. p. 2. 

 » Ely. op. cit.. p. 378. 

 " Ibid., p. 377. 



