Development of the Poseidon Undersea Launching System will provide 
a significant improvement in our strategic capability in this regard. 
However, we can look forward to the need for even greater strategic 
capabilities in the future. Moreover, a submarine-based missile force 
has some less-than-ideal characteristics. It is relatively expensive to 
operate compared to land-missile forces; and it is presently limited 
in warhead size. Consequently, the ocean-based missile force could 
conceivably take some totally new direction of development in the fu- 
ture which would hopefully combine many of the better characteristics 
of the land-based force: Less expensive, larger payloads; better com- 
mand and control, with some of the characteristics of the submarine 
force; i.e, invulnerability. This does not imply that we will not also 
have an interest in developing missile-carrying submarines capable of 
operating at much greater depths than currently. Perhaps the ocean 
bottom would help conceal their presence and thereby make them even 
less susceptible to enemy counteraction. 
Such developments may, for example, take the form of missiles of 
Polaris’ size or even considerably larger placed on relatively shallow 
underwater barge systems on the Continental Shelf in a way which 
conceals their location and requires the system to move infrequently so 
that the potential of its being tracked by motion-generated noise is 
minimized. In addition one might consider a slightly mobile ocean- 
bottom system which creeps along. Systems of this kind, if they are 
ever to be realized, will require different kinds of marine engineering 
research from that which produced the current submarine-based force. 
Such systems can involve much larger missiles, might require under- 
water maintenance by personnel also located underwater, might entail 
development of new kinds of implacement gear for positioning missiles, 
might necessitate new kinds of detection and survival equipment to 
prevent attacks on the implacements, and so on. 
In summary it is very possible that the kind of strategic offensive 
force we may wish to develop for the future will rely even more 
heavily on ocean-based systems than that which we now have. Such 
systems may very well require operations at a much wider range of 
ocean environment and for much longer times than at present. Thus, 
the need for oceanographic research and support of these weapon 
systems becomes even greater and will certainly have to encompass 
a wider problem area in development and maintenance of present sub- 
marine forces. These problems will range from ascertaining that the 
ocean-based systems cannot easily be compromised by an enemy’s ex- 
ploitation of some hiterto hidden effects of the ocean’s environment to 
development of massive ocean engineering capabilities. It is likely 
that the Navy’s involvement in oceanographic research to develop, 
support, and maintain our weapon systems will increase rather than 
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