deterrent force, coupled with the need for defenses against missile- 
launching submarines, implies that the Navy must develop the capabil- 
ity to operate anywhere within the oceans at any time. The Navy 
has underway a Deep Submergence Systems Project. This effort as 
presently constituted is insufficient if the Navy is to meet its goals in 
a reasonable time period. The Panel therefore recommends expansion 
of activities which will permit operation at any location and time 
within the oceans (see secs. 5.2, 5.3). It 1s recommended that a con- 
tinuing, special effort be made by the Navy to utilize personnel, facil- 
ities and know-how of the private sector in achieving its objectives 
in the Deep Submergence Systems and Man in the Sea Projects (see 
secs. 4.11, 5.3). Navy technological results in these programs should 
be made available to industry upon acquisition. 
The Navy presently has primary responsibility for development of 
capability for using man at depths in the oceans. The general level 
of research in the Man in the Sea Project is inadequate. In- 
sufficient attention has been give to biomedical problems of survival 
in the wet, cold, dark, high-pressure environment, and our efforts in 
this field lag well behind those of other countries. If the goals of the 
Man in the Sea Project are to be achieved, adequate opportunities must 
be provided for basic studies by a variety of institutions. In par- 
ticular we recommend establishment of a major shore facility fully 
equipped for the range of basic studies required by Man in the Sea. 
This facility should be associated with a university or medical re- 
search center. Navy efforts may need to be complemented through 
instrumented, movable, submersible laboratories for basic studies on 
man living beneath the sea’s surface for extended periods. ‘These 
laboratories should be available to a wide community of scholars 
outside the Navy who are interested in biomedical problems of man in 
the deep sea (see secs. 4.11, 10.7). 
The Panel recognizes that development of adequate programs in 
undersea technology and Man in the Sea may be hampered by tra- 
ditional views within the Navy to the effect that the Navy is primarily 
an operating force at or near the surface. If the Navy does not ade- 
quately pursue programs recommended in this report (see sec. 4), pro- 
gram responsibilities for Man in the Sea and undersea technology 
should be shifted to a civilian agency (see secs. 4, 5, 10.4). 
The 7hresher experience in 1963 and the recent lost nuclear weapon 
incident off the Spanish coast clearly illustrate the continuing im- 
portance of search-and-recovery capabilities. We recommend that 
ocean search-and-recovery missions related in any way to national 
security be the Navy’s responsibility. However, the technology de- 
veloped through such programs should be made available to industry 
on acurrent basis (see sec. 5.2). 
IX 
