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report, its investigation was limited, in tlie area to which I will ad- 

 dress myself, to the impact of merchant marine technology upon ports. 



Because of this very limited focus, and a general lack of understand- 

 ing or appreciation of the business of ports and shipping, the Com- 

 mission repeats the classic error common to most recent Federal 

 commentaries suggestive of Federal port planning. This error is the 

 mistake of relating specific trades involving highly specialized deep- 

 draft tankers to the general port requirements of the United States. 



The error is compounded by the indiscriminate grouping of contain- 

 erships, hydrofoil, and hovercraft with the supertanker and the as- 

 sumption that such vessels are all components of what the 

 Commission felt to be a common port problem, namely, the capability, 

 or lack of capability, of our ports to accommodate all of these dif- 

 ferent types of vessels. 



From this followed the recommendation by various Federal agencies 

 that what is required is a drastic departure from traditional and 

 historic approach toward port development in the United States. 



The Commission's report states that supertankers exceeding 300,000- 

 ton capacity are now on the building ways in Japan, specifically 

 designed for the carriage of Middle East crude oil to Western Europe 

 and to Japan, and then casts these against the depth of a vehicular 

 tunnel in Chesapeake Bay and dredging costs in New York and east 

 Texas. In doing so, it emphasizes a specialized and unique problem in 

 order to justify a conclusion that Federal planning and control of 

 the Nation's ports is essential for the future of maritime transportation. 



I am pleased to note that, as a result of strong factual presentations 

 by the AAPA to a number of agencies, the containership is no longer 

 identified as a superdraft threat of the same category, a fallacy in 

 earlier efforts of this kind. 



Except for the possible need for a realtively few regional oil un- 

 loading terminals served by adequate channels to accommodate deep- 

 draft tankers, the ports which will handle containerships will not 

 require channel deepening of major magnitude and cost. 



While I am in agreement with the statement made in the report 

 that "a port for containerships in the heart of the city adds to the 

 traffic problem and to the cost of transporting goods out of the port," 

 I should like to point out that if the Commission had thoroughly stud- 

 ied the existing and planned container facilities, it would have found 

 that they are not being located in the "heart" of cities but are generally 

 being built more on the periphery of the cities, where the necessary 

 upland areas and rail and highway access are available. 



It follows from such misconception and misdirection that the issue 

 of greatest concern to those engaged in port planning, development, 

 and operation is the underlying rationale of the port phase of the 

 report. What the Commission is porposing it Federal study and pre- 

 sumably Federal direction and possibly control over the entire far- 

 ranging field of port and terminal development (including land trans- 

 portation facilities) which have been historically and successfully 

 accomplished by non-Federal interests. 



That is unacceptable to the port industry. It is a complete reversal 

 of the traditional relationship between Federal and non-Federal in- 

 terests and responsibilities in this field of activity. 



The Commission's report also states "the maintenance of a major 

 port in every major coastal city is no longer justified." Implicit in 



