WHY OPERATION CROSSROADS? 



ust 28, 1945, by Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in- 

 Chief of the U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations 

 — be countermanded. He urged that a number of the 

 Japanese vessels be made available to the Army Air 

 Forces for use in tests involving atomic bombs and 

 other weapons. 



The Navy's response, made by Admiral King on 

 October 16, 1945, called for broadening the proposal 

 by having the Joint Chiefs of Staff control the tests 

 and by having all pertinent groups of Army and Navy 

 participate. Admiral King recommended that one 

 bomb be detonated in the air and another in the water, 

 and he made the very significant suggestion that a few 

 of our own modern naval vessels be included in the 

 target array. 



To get detailed planning underway. General Ar- 

 nold suggested on October 31, 1945, that the Joint 

 Statf Planners, a permanent working committee of the 

 Joint Chiefs of Staff, decide just what tests should be 

 made and what groups should make them. The sug- 

 gestion was accepted, and the Joint Staff Planners 

 were asked on November 10, 1945, to proceed. 



Their first act (November 13, 1945) was to appoint 

 an '^ad hoc subcommittee" to make a complete and de- 

 tailed proposal. This Subcommittee, usually called the 

 "LeMay Subcommittee," had the following member- 

 ship — after three early changes : 



Major General C. E. LeMay (Steering Member) 



Brigadier General W. A. Borden 



II 



