WHY OPERATION CROSSROADS? 



Debate was long and vigorous on the question of 

 fuel and ammunition loads. Air Forces' representa- 

 tives initially proposed having nearly every target ship 

 carry full loads of fuel and ammunition, to show the 

 maximum damage the atomic bomb could do, includ- 

 ing secondary effects of fires and ammunition ex- 

 plosions. Others opposed this proposal, pointing out 

 that with the ships crowded abnormally close together, 

 release and ignition of oil or gasoline from a single 

 ship might set fire to all adjacent ships; the result- 

 ing damage might give an entirely false picture of 

 what would happen to ships in their normal spacing. 

 Such fires might destroy much of the really significant 

 damage and large numbers of important scientific in- 

 struments too. (The satisfactory compromise reached 

 is discussed in Chapter 7.) 



The work of the LeMay Subcommittee culmi- 

 nated in a detailed plan submitted to the Joint Chiefs 

 of Staff and accepted by them (with a few minor 

 changes) on December 28, 1945. 



Vice Admiral Blandy w^as soon ready with a de- 

 tailed administrative and technical plan of action. The 

 Joint Chiefs of Staff gave preliminary approval to the 

 plan almost at once, and then referred it to the White 

 House. The President studied it, and added ' ^ Approved 

 Jan. 10, 1946. (signed) Harry S. Truman." 



The next day, January 11, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

 designated Admiral Blandy Commander of Joint Task 

 Force One, and directed him as follows: 



