EARLY PROBLEMS 



pected to become continually smaller, and might easily 

 be incapable of standing the expense. (5) Target ves- 

 sels, particularly the obsolete vessels, could not be held 

 available indefinitely. (6) Military and naval planners 

 had to proceed with plans for future strategy and 

 construction; the fundamental technical data were 

 needed almost immediate^. 



But technical and nontechnical men alike saw the 

 othe]' side. They saw that a suitable task force could 

 not be assembled overnight, that much paperwork 

 must be done before men could step forward to plan 

 and execute the operation capably. They realized that 

 readying the ships of the great target fleet would be 

 an enormous job; months would be required even if 

 many different shipyards cooperated in the work. They 

 knew that a multitude of scientific instruments of en- 

 tirely new types must be designed, built, tested, in- 

 stalled. They knew that careful rehearsals of all tech- 

 nical and operational phases would be required before 

 anything like full value could be got from the Tests. 



After consulting all his deputies and advisers, Ad- 

 miral Blandy named May 15, 1946, as date for the first 

 Test, the explosion in air; the second Test, the ex- 

 plosion beneath the surface of the lagoon, w^as to occur 

 approximately six weeks later. The race against time 

 was started. 



No one knows whether the race would have been 

 won or lost. For on March 22 a delay was ordered ; the 

 President directed that the Tests be postponed approxi- 



21 



