BOMBS AT BIKINI 



mately six weeks in order that Congressional observers 

 could complete their legislative work and yet see the 

 Tests. July 1, then, became the new target date.* 



What was the best altitude for Test A, the explosion 

 in air? This question shuttled back and forth across 

 conference tables for months. Scientists at Los Alamos 

 and in Washington swapped arguments as to what alti- 

 tude would produce sinkings at the greatest radius 

 or what altitude would produce moderate damage at 

 greatest radius. Clearly a low altitude w^ould better 

 insure sinking the nearest ships; but a greater alti- 

 tude would permit the blast wave to reach out farther 

 and do at least moderate damage at greater radius. 

 While these scientists were matching formulas and 

 graphs in friendly tussle to arrive at the best choice 

 of altitude, they were also re-studying the results of 

 the Alamogordo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki explosions. 



* One of the most unexpected results of the postponement was 

 the opportunity it gave to the Task Force's Wave Motion Section 

 to take the measure of the great tsunami ("tidal wave") which 

 struck the Hawaiian Islands on April 1, 1946. When the postpone- 

 ment was announced, the wave motion experts were en route to 

 Bikini; accordingly, they were directed to go to Pearl Harbor to 

 await further instructions. They had no warning there of the ap- 

 proach of the tsunami, and did not get their 65 tons of wave meas- 

 uring equipment into action. But they went to work quickly in- 

 specting the inundated areas and piecing together all availahle 

 evidence. A full report on the tsunami was issued later, and some 

 of the information learned was put to use in perfecting plans for 

 measuring homh- produced waves at Bikini. Mr. N. J. Hotter, head 

 of the Section, was asked to assure the population hy radio that 

 710 such, danger threatened in the forthcoming atoynic homh ex- 

 plosion. 



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