EARLY PROBLEMS 



The outcome: occasional major changes of mind, and 

 new line-ups of those favoring greater or lesser alti- 

 tude. 



Meanwhile the operational men were talking feasi- 

 hility. If it were much more convenient and accurate 

 to set off the bomb atop a cheap tower, then that would 

 be an argument for choosing an altitude you could 

 reach with such a tower. Some thought was given to 

 use of a tower, possibly on a headland if greater alti- 

 tude was desired. Little thought was given to placing 

 the bomb atop the mast of a battleship since this would 

 probably mean sure and almost meaningless loss of the 

 battleship, and in any case this would definitely limit 

 the altitude to about 100 feet. The feasibility of sus- 

 pending the bomb from a captive balloon was explored 

 and rejected, since officers familiar with the erratic 

 behavior of such balloons argued strongly against any 

 such plan. 



Other forces also were at work to influence the 

 choice of altitude. Some persons pointed out that a 

 rather low altitude would make Test A rather similar 

 to Test B in which the bomb was to be detonated at or 

 just below the surface. Air Forces' spokesmen pointed 

 out that dropping the bomb from an airplane would 

 not only provide invaluable experience in precision 

 atomic bombing but would also remove all restrictions 

 on altitude of the explosion, permitting the bomb to 

 be dropped from an optimum altitude. 



23 



