EARLY PROBLEMS 



The greater depth for Test B appealed to nearly 

 everyone except the engineers who would have the job 

 of placing the bomb at the specified depth and detonat- 

 ing it there. Atomic bombs are new; none had ever 

 been set off beneath the surface of the water. In at- 

 tempting such an unprecedented act, it would be neces- 

 sary to provide means of '' keeping in communication" 

 with the bomb at all times, not only to fire it (or, in an 

 emergency, to prevent its firing) but also to test it. 

 Unique security problems were presented too, since 

 for a short interval the bomb would be very close to 

 thousands of persons not authorized to see it. 



So difficult was the decision as to the best depth of 

 the bomb, that for a long time two alternative plans 

 were carried forward side by side. Not until late in 

 the winter was the final decision made : that the bomb 

 was to be suspended at appreciable depth — beneath 

 an ''expendable" ship. 



No one should think that these problems arose at 

 expected times in well-crystallized form. They appeared 

 unexpectedly; they had a habit of being almost inex- 

 tricably tied up with other unanswered questions. 

 Many of them arose even before the creation of Joint 

 Task Force One on January 11, 1946, before clear 

 lines of authority were established, before a firm direc- 

 tive had been issued as to the principal purposes of 

 the Tests. And the key persons concerned were usually 

 scattered across the country. A question raised by a 

 scientist at Los Alamos, New Mexico, might be sent by 



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