PLANS AND PLANNERS 



as more-or-less rigged shows to ''prove" that the Navy 

 was not obsolete ; they hinted that the Navy feared most 

 of all, and for that reason w^as avoiding, the deep- 

 under-water explosion of an atomic bomb with its re- 

 sulting possibility of extensive damage to ships. 



But perhaps the commonest distortion was as to 

 the great calamities which were to threaten. Massive 

 underwater landslides might be tripped off ; enormous 

 tidal waves might sweep across the Pacific and devas- 

 tate its shores; the very crust of the earth might be 

 parted, with unimaginable consequences. The chain 

 reaction in the bomb might spread to the water and the 

 whole ocean might explode. Conjecture had no limita- 

 tions except man's imagination. 



The majority of the misconceptions were gradually 

 dislodged by the steady stream of facts issued to press 

 and radio by Captain Lee and his assistants. Within 

 the first few weeks after the creation of the Task 

 Force, Captain Lee had prepared and issued over fort}^ 

 bulletins, which covered nearly every phase of the 

 Operation. Open news conferences were held too. Ad- 

 miral Blandy and his staff sat across the table from 

 dozens of the country's best correspondents and gave 

 spot answers to their searching questions concerning 

 the atomic tests. 



Again and again they explained that the Tests were 

 not Navy tests but Joint tests, to be carried out at the 

 request of the Joint Chiefs of Staif and with the 



35 



