nish maximum scientific and technical information from expected 

 results. 



When the bomb exploded, the battleship ARKANSAS, nearest 

 to the center of impact, and three other smaller ships sank at once. 

 The aircraft carrier SARATOGA, also placed close by, sank 71/0 

 hours later. As soon as radioactivity lessened sufficiently to permit 

 safe operations, the destroyer HUGHES and the attack transport 

 FALLON were beached to prevent their possible sinking. Of the 

 eight submarines involved, six were submerged. Several of these 

 appear to be injured and one at least has gone to the bottom. The 

 two on the surface are not noticeably injured. All but a few of the 

 target ships were drenched with radioactive sea water, and all 

 within the zone of evident damage are still unsafe to board. It 

 is estimated that the radioactivity dispersed in the water was the 

 equivalent to that from many hundred tons of radium. 



We believe that interesting distinctions between the general 

 results of the two explosions can even now be drawn without 

 the risk of serious error. Both explosions sank several ships. 

 From the limited observations we have thus far been able to make, 

 the ships remaining afloat within the damage area appear to have 

 been more seriously damaged by the aerial explosion than by the 

 submarine explosion. The damage to ships in the first test might 

 have been far greater if the bomb had exploded directly over the 

 target ship, the NEVADA. 



In the first test much of the personnel within the ships would 

 have received fatal doses of neutrons and gamma rays from the 

 first deadly flash. On the other hand, the deadly effects of persistent 

 radioactivity would have been much more severe in the second 

 test. Had the target array been manned, it seems clear that casual- 

 ties and both physical and psychological injury to personnel would 

 have been very great. Rescue and attention to casualties would be 

 difficult and dangerous. Within 2000 yards of explosion, ships would 

 probably have been inoperative and a lapse of weeks might well 

 ensue before relatively undamaged ships could again be used in 

 combat. 



The second bomb caused a deluge of water loaded with deadly 

 radioactive elements over an area that embraced 90 per cent of the 

 target array. Such results might be as disastrous to the fleet as 

 results of the first test, although in part for different reasons. 

 An enemy possessed of two or more bombs might well so dispose 

 them as to create simultaneously the deadly features of both tests. 

 Such tactics might effectively dispose of a fleet for many months ; 

 for example, consider a Pearl Harbor attack on these lines. 



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