In all instances, the panel pressed for priority. "What would you do 

 first?" In response to this, specific goals (not specific ocean engineering 

 applications) were usually offered: The ])anel was offered not |)riorities, 

 but selection schemes to find them. Criteria such as urgency, responsi- 

 bility, return vs cost, multiplier effect, and imjiact were suggested. 

 The relation to energy was offered as a selection device which would 

 imply emphasis on exploration, surveying, offshore federal expertise 

 in drilling and harvesting, information to get oflPshore jjlants on line 

 faster, power-plant siting, suljsurface soil mechanics, loading factors on 

 structures from wind, wave, and current, and energy sources (oil, wind, 

 wave, current) . 



Instrumentation was another area to draw attention, in particular 

 monitoring gear, satisfactory subsurface instrumentation, instruments 

 for tidal measurements, wave heights, and surveys. Suggestions were 

 made that user needs would indicate priority, such as those for siiipping, 

 petroleum, minerals, construction, recreation, national security, and 

 ocean sciences. Bold pilot projects in energy discovery were suggested 

 from which ocean engineering priorities would develop— and so forth. 



A persuasive case was made for the critical importance of materials 

 research, especially as materials are affected by fatigue under cyclical 

 loading, and in stress corrosion where the chemical action of seawater 

 affects materials in an unusual way. 



Nevertheless, the common trend did not turn out to be a specific 

 high priority application. Instead it was the apparent inability to 

 choose what ought to be done first. Despite an almost universal if 

 poorly defined distress at not doing things that ought to be done there 

 was instead a helter-skelter looking in all different directions and 

 reaching for schemes to pick winners. Specific application of ocean 

 engineering to civilian needs appeared trivial as candidates for a na- 

 tional effort, yet the more general suggestions for enhancement of 

 ocean engineering capability sounded poorly thought out, open-ended 

 in cost, and groping for support. 



It was also evident that there is no natural government sponsor 

 for the genera] support of civilian ocean engineering needs. Of the 

 government agencies with direct interest in the oceans, only the Navy 

 has responsibility for pursuing advanced technology directly; other 

 agencies, such as the Department of Interior, NOAA, the Coast Guard, 

 etc. relate the ocean engineering needs to their service requirements 

 and so no one has a broad oversight. 



FINDINGS: Summary 



The marine implications of the over-riding need for the U.S. to 

 decrease its dependence on other nations for what is critical to its own 

 existence are too important for the United States to let drift. 



13 



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