66 



the limits of the continental shelf proposed in his resolution differed 

 from those proposed by the Commission, He preferred the 550 meter 

 isobath or a distance of 50 nautical miles from the baselines used to 

 measure the breadth of the territorial sea, whichever gave the coastal 

 state a greater area offshore for purposes of mineral resources exploita- 

 tion. "I selected the 550-meter figure," he testified, "on the basis that 

 the edge of the Outer Continental Shelf is not known to occur at any 

 greater depth." ^* In effect this isobath encompasses the topographic 

 configuration of most of the world's shelves, to the greatest depth, 

 rather than to the average depth of 200 meters. Mr. Pell made a dis- 

 tinction between the "continental terrace" and the "continental shelf," 

 that differed from the position of the oil industry of equating the two. 



And here, Mr. Chairman, I must emphasize the shell game in which, I believe, 

 the oil industry has been engaged in the past few years : when you and I went to 

 school, continental shelf meant that portion of the submerged continental land 

 mass that is in relatively shallow water and terminates at the beginning of the 

 continental slope. The oil industry has thrown up a smoke screen by trying to 

 equate the continental shelf with the continental terrace concept, which includes 

 the slope.^^ 



On how wide the national jurisdiction of a state should be offshore, 

 Mr. Pell favored the narrowest possible zone. If the United States 

 claimed a certain width, he argued, it should be assumed that other 

 nations would do likewise. "Thus the larger the offshore zone we con- 

 template bringing under our national jurisdiction means that on 

 balance we are closing off a much larger zone worldwide, assuming as 

 we must that other states would be entitled to claim a similar area." ^® 



Later in 1970, Senator Pell reiterated his support for the early 

 achievement of an international legal order in the ocean floor in his 

 comments on the President's proposal for a seabed regime : 



I bring up this point, Mr. President, merely to show how ivn issue SiS important 

 as nuclear arms control can suffer because of the chaos nations have made oif 

 the law of sea ; and here I should point out that in earlier years the United States 

 has been just as guilty in helping to create this sad state of affairs as Chile and 

 Ecuador or, more recently, Brazil and Canada. 



But we now understand the error of our ways, and I am convinced that the 

 policy initiatives which this administration has taken in trying to bring about a 

 meaningful legal order of the oce^ans deserve the full support of every Member of 

 this Chamber.'" 



Position of the Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf 



A systematic analysis of the hearings was presented in the Metcalf 

 Subcommittee's report to the Committee on Interior and Insular 

 Affairs. ^^ The Subconmiittee considered the 1958 Geneva Convention 

 validly operative, and saw no need to convene another Law of the Sea 

 Conference. It also considered the geological interpretation of the 

 continental margin as making that portion of the seabed essentially 

 property of the United States. The Subconmiittee further indicated 

 its preference for the exploitability clause in the Convention which 



"Ibid., page 380. 



B5 Ibid., page 395. 



««Ibld., page 396. 



87 Claiborne Pell. "Barring of nuclear weapons from the seabed and ocean floor." State- 

 5^ L°^,tn?,^?°°• Claiborne Pell on the floor of the Senate. Congressional Record (Septem- 

 ber 16, 1970), page S 15616. 



o>,*^iF»^-T,^°°^r®P- Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. "Outer Continental 

 bftelf Report by the Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf. 91st Congress, 

 second session. December 21, 1970. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971) 



