68 



For the United States [asserted ttie Subcommittee] , or any other law-abiding 

 naltion, to offer to renounce its inherent sovereign rights to the mineral estate 

 of its continental margin in the hope that these few recalcitrant niations would 

 mend their ways and begin to adhere to the freedom of the seas d'odtrine is like 

 offering to pay r'ansom to bandits in order to encourage them to stop stealing. 

 When bandits receive ransom, they only grab for more. Thus, to renounce what 

 constitutes the heart of our sovereign rights in response to illegal demands by 

 a handful of nations can only encourage greater violation of the freedom of the 

 seas dodtrine.^"* 



On resources of the seaibed beyond the continental margin, the Sub- 

 committee shared with the President the desire that such ocean re- 

 sources be used rationally and equitably for the benefit of mankind. 

 However, prior to the adoption of a seabed treaty, cautioned the Sub- 

 committee, "the U.S. Government should provide measures designed 

 to insure protection of investors who desire to exercise present high 

 seas rights to explore and exploit the wealth of the deep seabed be- 

 yond the limits of the submerged land continent." ^°* 



The Subcommittee concluded that the major tasks to be considered 

 in the 92d Congress were : 



1. A continuing extensive review of the working paper intro- 

 duced by the U.S. delegation at the August [1970] session of the 

 United Nations Seabed Committee with a view toward seeking 

 modifications of it to conform to our interpretation of the Presi- 

 dent's intent and with our recommendations outlined above. 



2. An investigation of the special prcvblem of an interim policy 

 which would insure continued exploration and exploitation of the 

 natural resources of our continental margin under present law; 

 and would establish appropriate protection for investments re- 

 lated to mineral recovery by U.S. nationals in areas of the deep 

 seabed beyond the limits of exclusive national jurisdiction.^°^ 



POSITION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRATSTCII 



In the section of this study that discussed the Continental Shelf, 

 it was shown that U.S. policy on ocean resources began in earnest with 

 the Truman Proclamation of 1945. The proclamation was designed 

 primarily to provide a policv and legal framework for regulating 

 offshore operations of the U.S. petroleum industry. When viewed 

 in the perspective of international legal concepts and the world's 

 technological capabilities at that time, the Truman Proclamation 

 might have been considered unnecessary. Ocean technology was then 

 almost exclusively possessed by the United States, and no other nation 

 had the technical capability to exploit the resources of the U.S. 

 continental shelf. The Proclamation had the effect of stimulating 

 proclamations by other countries, such as the Declaration of Santiago 

 in 1952, whereby national sovereignty and jurisdiction were extended 

 out to 200 miles offshore. Thus, the' Truman Proclamation could be 

 taken as the beginning of legal chaos in international maritime 

 affairs, which has persisted to date despite the efforts made at the 

 1958 Geneva Conventions. 



Experience pointed to the conclusion that unilateral action — perhaps 

 accompanied by a scramble to stake out national claims to the "riches 



'<wibid., page 30. 

 >"* Ibid., page 32. 

 105 Ibid., page 33. 



