70 



Seabed Disarmament Treaty 



In its opening paragraph on ocean science and technology and na- 

 tional security, the President's Science Advisory Committee stated : 



The most urgent aspect of Federal involvement in ocean science and technol- 

 ogy for the next 5 to 10 years relates to national security in the narrow, strictly 

 military sense. The U.S. Navy, which has responsibility for essentially all our 

 defense efforts involving the ocean environment, will have increasing need for 

 specialized oceanographic data for specific devices being developed or improved 

 and will continue to require better understanding of characteristics of the ocean 

 environment in which it operates.^'" 



Although this statement referred to needs in support of specific 

 projects, it also reflected the need for ihQ U.S. Navy to explore the 

 oceans throughout the world and not merely in the coastal areas of 

 the United States. This need, coupled with the military presence 

 required in numerous parts of the oceans, formed the basic justifica- 

 tion for freedom on the high seas, and for the privilege of approach- 

 ing as close as possible the coasts of other nations. The military view 

 has been, and continues to be, that any extension of territorial seas 

 should be kept to a minimum, that sovereignty over the continental 

 shelves, regardless of their boundaries, should be closely limited, and 

 that the air space above the high seas should remain free. In the 

 words of Dr. Eobert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 

 Research and Development : 



The security of the United States rests in part on the Navy's use of the high 

 seas, and we would like to see the use and legal coverage of the high seas develop 

 in such a way as not to imi)ede this portion of our security unnecessarily.^'^ 



With this attitude and background, the United States began to 

 evaluate a draft treaty submitted by the USSR on March 18, 1969, 

 providing for prohibition of the emplacement on the seabed and the 

 ocean floor and the subsoil thereof of objects with nuclear weapons 

 or any other weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of 

 military bases, structures, installations, etc., beyond the twelve-mile 

 zone. The measure appeared to call for total disarmament of the 

 seabed, the Soviet Uriion having equated the uses of the seabed for 

 "peaceful uses" with "non-military purposes," by analogy with the 

 provisions of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. 



The United States considered the proposed complete demilitariza- 

 tion "unworkable and probably harmful." The U.S. representative 

 pointed out that defense against submarines involved placing warn- 

 ing systems on the seabed, and that military personnel participated 

 in scientific research in that environment. On May 22, 1969, the 

 United States countered with its own version of a seabed treaty, 

 prohibiting the emplacement of fixed nuclear weapons or other weap- 

 ons of mass destruction or associated fixed launching platforms on, 

 within, or beneath the seabed and ocean floor. 



In presenting the draft treaty, the U.S. representative pointed out 

 that the 3-mile territorial sea would leave a larger area subject to 



lo^U.S. President's Science i^dvisory Committee. "Effective Use of the Sea." Reonrt of 

 tlie Panel on Oceanography. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1966). 

 page .'^O. 



"8 Robert A. Frosch. "Exploiting marine mineral resources: Problems of national se- 

 curity and .inrisdiotion." Speech delivered at the Naval War College Co^iference on Mineral 

 Resources of the World Ocean, July 12, 196S. Vital Speeches of the Day, (November 15, 

 1968), page 71. 



