74 



expansion. After 1957, missiles replaced bombers for strategic deter- 

 rence, resulting in the development of land-based systems of inter- 

 continental ballistic missiles, and submarine-based nuclear missiles. 

 Military technological breakthroughs continued t« reshape military 

 strategy in the 1960's. Improved accuracy and longer range and 

 larger delivery systems permitted the production of large numbers of 

 sophisticated missiles such as the Minuteman and the Polaris sub- 

 marine-launched system. The development of reconnaissance satellites 

 permitted both the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain 

 surveillance on each other's land-based systems. 



Land-based systems (Minuteman and SS-9, for example), how- 

 ever, have their vulnerability : They can be detected by reconnaisance 

 satellites and other means ; accuracy of attacking missiles is advanc- 

 ing so fast that it can be measured in a fraction of a mile; MIEV 

 systems can deliver an overwhelming load of warheads, dispropor- 

 tionate to land-based missiles, rendering them increasingly vulnerable. 



The shift in strategy toward the ocean environment, therefore, has 

 become obvious and necessary. Numerous analysts have expounded 

 the advantages of undersea weapons systems as being less targetable 

 than their land-based counterparts. The most obvious advantages are 

 their mobility, concealability, and survivability following a sudden 

 nuclear attack. Furthermore, their range throughout ocean space has 

 an added safety factor in deploying away from populated areas. 



The absorption of water with respect to light, high-energy particles, electro- 

 magnetic radiation, heat and other known forms of energy is such that, except 

 for acoustic radiation, none of the mechanisms postulated has a detection range 

 potential which is significant when compared with the vast areas available 

 in the ocean. The ultimate test in this regard is the ability of the submersible to 

 blend with and be masked by the environment. At near zero speed this ought 

 to be quite modest, and if, for example, power is supplied by fuel cell, the ma- 

 chinery associated with it should be extremely quiet. Drifting in the current, 

 at great depth or at low speeds, the hydrodynamic wake would be insignificant. 

 A further aid would be the capability to move very close to the bottom, rendering 

 the submersible diflBicult to detect by long-range, active sonar. Ultimately, the 

 underseas weapons systems could develop into something akin to a manned, on- 

 the-bottom, slowly mobile mine."'' 



For the United States, ocean advantages are enhanced by worldwide 

 interests which have been conventionally served by land bases overseas. 

 These bases have been dwindling in number, and those left are subject 

 to political uncertainties. The Second Fleet in the Atlantic, the Sixth 

 Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific are 

 affected by basing problems. Floating support can be maintained simi- 

 lar to the system which largely aids the operation of the Sixth Fleet. 

 Objections to this type of support include its high cost and vulnerabil- 

 ity. Many alternatives have been envisaged for overeas bases, such as 

 floating platforms of large dimensions derived from the technology of 

 offshore exploration and exploitation. 



Very great changes are expected in naval capa^bilities as a result of 

 technological developments in submarine warfare. Gordon J. F. Mac- 

 Donald envisions for the 1970's that — 



"3 John P. Craven, "Ocean technology and submarine warfare." In "Implications of 

 Military Technology Into the 1970s." Adelnhi Paper No. 46. (London, Institute for 

 Strategic Studies, March 1968), pages 38-46. Dr. Craven was for some years chief scientist 

 of the Special Projects Office of the Department of the Navy, that developed the Polaris 

 system. 



