COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 19 
(a) In permitting the substitution of a permanent platform for 
the originally contemplated temporary one, 1t meant that the perma- 
nent platform would be jacked up above the water before the legs had 
been embedded into the ocean floor and before any concrete stiffening 
had been placed in the legs. ! 
(6) Without the legs first being embedded, there was insufficient 
draft (water depth) above the upper panels of bracing to float the 
platform into position between them. For this reason, the upper 
panels of bracing had to be folded down in the initial stages of con- 
struction to be connected up later underwater. 
(c) In order to fold down the upper panel of bracings, an increase 
in the tolerance between the size of the pin and the holes into which 
they were to be inserted was granted. Difficulty in fabrication had 
required an increase in tolerance from the 1%, inch called for in the 
design to 4, inch. For the upper panels of bracing this was further 
increased to 1% inch. 
The design engineers had first approved, then later disapproved, the 
method proposed by Steers for lashing down the diagonal struts dur- 
ing the tow to site and transmitted to Steers certain required modifica- 
tions. It is inferred from the testimony of Mr. Rau that the modi- 
fications required by the design engineers reduced the strength of the 
lashings from that inherent in the Steers’ proposal. 
The template (consisting of the three legs and their permanent 
and temporary bracings) and, in a separate element, the permanent 
platform, were towed to sea from Portland Harbor on June 28, 1957. 
‘The template was floated in a horizontal position resting on the A-B 
plane in accordance with the Kuss patent. 
Mr. Kuss had granted a royalty-free license to his employers, Moran, 
Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge, who, in turn, granted an identical license 
to the U.S. Government for the construction of tower No. 4. 
A storm, which did not exceed the criteria for the towing operation, 
occurred at the site which delayed the tip-up process. It was dis- 
covered that the two diagonals in the upper panel of braces on the 
A-B side had broken loose from their lashings and were damaged. 
During the tip-up process these diagonals sheared off their connecting 
pin plates and were lost. 
The Navy’s officer in charge of construction, Comdr. Edmund 
Foster (CEC), USN, the designers, and the contractor held various 
discussions over the action which should be taken in view of the 
structural mishap which had occurred. The two alternatives were 
to return the template to port to effect repairs or to attempt repairs 
at sea. Commander Foster declined to assume responsibility for the 
decision. Conversely, the contractor denied making the decision and 
testified that the responsibility had to rest with the Navy. The 
design engineers disclaimed any responsibility for the decision. All 
the parties concerned, however, agreed that the other party’s decision 
in attempting repairs at sea was correct. 
_ The platform was towed into position between the three legs (now 
in a vertical position) and sea swells of about 3 feet in height caused 
it to dent the three legs, the indentations being an average of 10 
feet high, 6 to 8 feet wide, and about 10 to 12 inches deep. The 
plating of the legs exposed to the crushing action of the platform 
framework was 134, inch thick which was too thin, without. being 
