COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 31 
cable bracing had been installed, having learned this from Mr. Kuss 
by telephone earlier in the morning. Therefore, he stated, with the 
diagonal broken, the installation of the cross cable bracing alone would 
not of itself restore the integrity of the tower. 
When Mr. Kuss joined the meeting in the afternoon, he stated 
that the tower was in critical condition with the lowest diagonal 
broken, and that it would require an entirely new scheme of repair 
and modification to bring the tower back to its original strength, at 
a probable cost of more than $1 million. 
It was at this same meeting that Mr. Kuss was again, and re- 
peatedly, requested to advise as to the tower’s remaining strength 
in accordance with the responsibility his firm had assumed within 
the meaning of item 4 of the Steers contract with the Air Force, viz.: 
This statement of the present structural stability and ‘storm worthiness” 
will be of key importance to the Air Force personnel evacuation procedures for 
‘Texas tower No. 4 to prevent the loss of life in the future. 
In response to these requests, Mr. Kuss would only say, in sub- 
stance, that he, Kuss, had made an analysis on the structural integrity 
of the tower after the newly designed cable bracing would have been 
installed, and with the lowest diagonal considered ineffective; that 
(under this hypothetical state) the overall integrity of the struc- 
ture would be 55 percent of its design strength, but that his figure 
could not be apphed in direct proportions to the wind and to the 
wave criteria of the original design because these forces vary with 
the square of the wind velocity and only approximately with wave 
height. 
Mr. Kuss testified before the subcommittee that a complete evalua- 
tion of the tower’s strength would take about a week’s time. 
As a result of the meeting of January 12, 1961, it was decided to 
completely evacuate the tower by February 1, 1961. This was the 
date at which Steers would have used the grouting (sand, gravel, 
and cement) supplies, rewelded the X bracing above water, and this 
would also have allowed the Air Force time in which to winterize and 
preserve equipment which would be left on board pending a return in 
the spring to resume repair under more favorable weather conditions. 
The cable bracing had not been installed. 
Three days later, January 15, 1961, at 7:25 p.m., on a Sunday 
evening, during a winter storm, Texas tower No. 4 collapsed. There 
were no survivors of the 28 men on board. 
The maximum prevailing weather at the time the tower disappeared, 
from the radar scope of the supply ship, consisted of winds of force 
11 (approximately 55 knots) and waves of 35 to 40 feet in height. 
6. Search and survey activities 
When tower No. 4 disappeared from his radarscope, Capt. Sixto 
Mangual, the master of the supply ship, radioed that he had lost 
radar and radio contact with the tower and presumed that it had 
collapsed. He was ordered to confirm his message and approach 
the site where the tower had been. 
The aircraft carrier Wasp, which happened to be in the area some 
2 hours distant, approached the scene and assumed command of res- 
cue operations. 
