COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 35 
The platform still has affixed to it 115 feet of the A leg, the other 
two legs having broken off at the base of the platform. Each of the 
legs fractured at their footings with the possible exception of the B 
leg which appears to have bent over at the footing without splitting. 
The footings are apparently in good condition without any evidence 
of fracture, movement, or scour. 
Concerned over the structural integrity of and safety of personnel 
on board the remaining two towers which, it states, continue to be an 
operational requirement of the military service, the Air Force re- 
quested the Navy to take such measures as might be necessary to 
evaluate the safety of those towers. Pursuant to that request, Capt. 
Thomas J. White (CEC), USN, the district public works officer of 
the First Naval District, negotiated a contract with the design engi- 
neers, Moran, Proctor, Mueser & Rutledge, to perform this evaluation 
at an estimated cost of $225,000 to $250,000. A portion of this evalu- 
ation took the form of hindcasting the wind and wave forces actually 
experienced at the tower No. 4 location and extending the results of 
these evaluations to the maximum wind and wave conditions that 
aster now be considered possible at the locations for towers Nos. 
2 and 3. 
Captain White maintained that the obligation of the design engi- 
neers under this contract is merely to determine whether the two re- 
maining towers were constructed in accordance with the design. On 
the other hand, in view of the fact that the design criteria for tower 
No. 4 proved to be inadequate, that the tower had taken the lives of 
28 persons, and that many more lives were at stake on towers Nos. 2 
and 3, the reason for conducting the evaluation is to determine whether 
the men on board are safe and not merely to determine whether the 
construction of the towers was in accordance with a design criteria 
which had proved to be inadequate. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Based upon its investigation and the testimony elicited from open 
hearings held on the collapse of Texas tower No. 4, the subcommittee 
makes the following findings and conclusions: 
I 
Finding —The Navy’s Bureau of Yards and Docks, at the request 
of the Air Force, agreed to act as its design and construction agency 
in the implementation of the Texas-tower concept. 
Committee conclusion.—A substantial portion of the responsibility 
for the defects, deficiencies, and inadequacies in the design and con- 
struction, and in some cases in the repair, of Texas tower No. 4 rests 
squarely upon the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Department 
of the Navy. 
II 
Finding —Texas tower No. 4 was designed to withstand winds of 
125 miles per hour in combination with breaking waves of 35 feet in 
height measured from trough to crest. This criteria was unquestion- 
ably exceeded during Hurricane Donna in September 1960, when winds 
of 132 miles per hour and breaking waves of at least 50 feet in height 
were experienced. It had also been exceeded by recorded or reliably 
