COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 37 
of the template in requiring an alternate method of lashing down the 
braces. 
2. The damage to and ultimate loss of the diagonal braces in the 
upper panel on the A—B side constituted a major and serious structural 
break or mishap. 
3. While there is a conflict of engineering opinion on the use of pin 
connections as opposed to welded connections for a structure sub- 
jected to the continuous unrelenting random forces of the sea, if 
pins were to be used, the subcommittee does not believe that increases 
in tolerances above those called for in the original specifications should 
have been permitted. 
4. The increased tolerances in the pin connections permitted move- 
ment of the tower in reacting to the forces of the seas. The movement 
of the tower in turn caused an aggravation and deterioration in those 
pin tolerances to the point where their looseness and wearing reached 
alarming proportions. 
Vv 
Finding —W hen the loss of the two diagonal braces was discovered, 
the alternatives were to return the template te port for repair or to 
proceed with the erection of the tower and attempt repairs at sea. 
The naval officer in charge of construction declined to assume respon- 
sibility for the decision and asserted that the contractor had sole au- 
thority for the decision. Conversely, the contractor denied making 
the decision and testified that the responsibility for the decision had 
to rest with the Navy. The structural design engineers disclaimed 
any responsibility for the decision. However, all parties concerned 
agreed that the other party’s decision was correct in attempting repairs 
at sea. 
Committee conclusion.— 
1. The Navy cannot escape or avoid responsibility for this decision 
as the naval officer in charge of construction was vested with the power 
and authority to direct the contractor to return the template to port 
for repair. 
2. The decision to remain at sea and attempt underwater repair of 
the braces was, in the opinion of the subcommittee, the point of no 
return and the time at which the fate of the tower was sealed. 
VI 
Finding —The attempted replacement at sea of the lost braces, in 
accordance with the method designed by the structural design engi- 
neers, was handicapped by the motion of the tower and the inherent 
restrictions of underwater repair work of such magnitude. This 
repair, a collar attachment secured by Dardelet bolts, completed by 
November 1957, failed to hold and the deficiency was not. corrected 
until T-bolts were installed in May 1959. In the fall of 1958, the 
structural design engineers issued their first warning that a definite 
hazard existed to the safety of the tower and the personnel aboard. 
Committee conclusion.— 
1. The initial deficiency occurring in July 1957 in the upper tier of 
bracing on the A-B side, although modified in November 1957 and cor- 
rected by May 1959, was the first indication of structural weakness in 
