40 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 
Xa 
Finding.—The Air Force, as the using agency, operated and main- 
tained the tower over a period of several years during which time it 
had actual knowledge and continued notice and warning of the dangers 
and hazards inherent in the structure. From August 10, 1960, the date 
at which the tower had last been certified as being up to design 
strength, to the date of its collapse on January 15, 1961, the Air Force 
was given information on the nature and extent of the tower’s damage. 
Conunittee conclusions —The Air Force is chargeable with the re- 
sponsibility for the safety and well-being of the personnel on board the 
tower, both civilian and military, and must accept a substantial portion 
of the blame for the loss of the 28 persons on board at the time of 
collapse in failing to order a timely evacuation of the tower. 
It was apparent from September 12, 1960, the date at which Hurri- 
cane Donna caused such serious damage, to January 15, 1961, a period 
of 4 months, that the tower was greatly weakened ; that 1t was in a dan- 
gerous condition and that it was highly unsafe. The winter storm 
season was in progress and it was known that it would continue for 
several months more. A complete evaluation of the tower should have 
been made and all personnel evacuated or, as a minimum alternative, 
highly effective measures taken which would insure safe and timely 
evacuation of all personnel in advance of any predicted storms. 
xI 
Finding —The Air Force, concerned over the safety of the personnel 
still on board the remaining two towers, immediately after the collapse 
of tower No. 4 requested the Navy to take necessary action to evaluate 
the safety and integrity of towers Nos. 2 and 3. Pursuant to the Air 
Force request, the Navy, on January 24, 1961, awarded a negotiated 
contract to the structural design engineers to perform this evaluation 
at an estimated cost of $225,000 to $250,000. Towers Nos. 2 and 3 
are still in the process of being evaluated. No report has yet been 
prepared, therefore no finding has been made by the structural design 
engineers that these two towers are safe. 
Committee conclusion—The action of the Navy in awarding a 
contract to the structural design engineers to evaluate the safety of 
structures which they themselves had designed and particularly in 
view of the many structural failures and ultimate collapse of tower 
No. 4, also of their design, constituted a grave and serious error of 
judgment. 
The subcommittee can only conclude that it would have been not only 
preferable but virtually mandatory under the circumstances that such 
an evaluation be performed by independent experts who took no part 
in either the design, construction, or repair of any of the Texas towers. 
xIT 
Finding—The Air Force does not propose to replace tower No. 4 
and has informed the subcommittee that the continued operation of 
towers Nos. 2 and 3 remains an operational requirement in our national 
defense radar system. 
