6 COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER NO. 4 
The Lincoln Laboratory report also contained certain recommenda- 
tions as to the means by which the towers should be constructed along 
with certain conclusions on oceanographic considerations, two of which 
are set forth verbatim as bearing on subsequent events. 
All authorities that have been consulted agree that the maximum storm wave 
in the area considered will be 40 feet high. * * * From the point of view of 
‘wave damage, there are no serious problems.+ 
In design, the wave problem is twofold. The structure must be high enough to 
‘prevent wave action from reaching the flat horizontal platform and the structure, 
necessarily subjected to wave action, must be strong enough to avoid failure.2 
Having preliminarily determined feasibility, the Air Force con- 
ducted negotiations and discussions with the Department of the Navy’s 
Bureau of Yards and Docks and agreement was reached that the 
Bureau would act as the design and construction agency for the Air 
Force in the implementation of the Texas tower concept. This desig- 
nation took place early in 1954. 
Ultimately, the District Public Works Office of the First Naval Dis- 
trict, with headquarters in Boston, Mass., took charge of the program 
and on April 9, 1954, convened a selection board to choose, from a list 
submitted to it, the architectural and engineering firm to conduct a 
more detailed feasibility study and report on the proposed offshore 
radar platforms. At its meeting on that date, the board decided to 
select for this study a firm or firms which possessed no “pet” or pat- 
ented features for this type of construction on the theory that a more 
objective evaluation would be made as to existing designs or modifica- 
tions thereof to suit the field conditions prevailing at the various sites. 
While this decision eliminated from consideration at least three cor- 
porations having considerable experience in the design and construc- 
tion of offshore platforms, 1.e., DeLong Corp., Merritt, Chapman & 
Scott, and Frederick Snare Corp., these firms would, however, be per- 
mitted to bid for the construction of the towers designed by others. 
The selection board * recommended and the then district public 
works officer * concurred, that a joint venture composed of the firms of 
Anderson-Nichols Co. of Boston, Mass., and Moran, Proctor, Mueser 
& Rutledge of New York City be selected for the feasibility study and 
report. A letter of intent was duly issued on June 18, 1954, and sub- 
sequently implemented by the award of BuDocks contract NOy-82761. 
Conflict developed in the testimony as to the contemplated division 
of responsibility between the two firms in the conduct of the feasibility 
study and, subsequently, in the design of the towers themselves. On 
the one hand, Mr. E. Ross Anderson, president of Anderson-Nichols 
Co., testified that when it appeared that his firm was seriously being 
considered as the architectural and engineering firm for the Texas 
towers, he invited the participation of the Moran, Proctor firm in the 
program for what he termed the submarine foundation or footings 
only, the footings being that portion of the foundation structure which 
is embedded in the ocean floor and on which the legs of the tower rest, 
because of their more extensive experience and enviable reputation as 
designers of that type of foundation. The design of the heavy struc- 
tural components, such as the legs, the braces, if any, and the platform 
Ayan el report, p. 11. 
2TIbid., p. 8. 
2 The board was composed of the following members: Comdr. J. J. Albers, Comdr. F. L. 
Biggs, Lieutenant LaPorte, D. Y. Taylor, with S. S. Swindells as recorder. 
4Capt. William Wesanen (CEC), U.S. Navy. 
