THE COLLAPSE OF TEXAS TOWER 
NO. 4 
INTRODUCTION 
By the year 1952, the necessity for radar detection of hostile aircraft 
at least 300 miles from their intended targets within the United 
States— a capability that our shore-based radars did not then possess— 
had become apparent to all those who had studied the problems asso- 
ciated with the Air Defense of the continental United States. Studies 
were made to determine whether there were particular regions off our 
shores where a cheaper and more reliable substitute for radar picket 
ships might be installed. Five locations were found off the northeast 
coast of the United States where structures, patterned after the oil- 
drilling rigs in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Texas, could be 
erected so as to provide proper radar coverage. They were to 
become known as the Texas towers. However, only three of the five 
were actually built, these being more specifically identified as Texas 
towers Nos. 2, 8, and 4. 
Tower No. 4, the last one to be built, toppled into the sea in 185 feet 
of water at 7:25 p.m., Sunday evening, January 15, 1961, during a 
North Atlantic storm, taking with it the lives of 28 persons, 14 of 
whom were military personnel of the Air Force, the remaining 14 
being civilian construction workers who were engaged in the further 
repair of the structure. 
The day following the tragedy, the Preparedness Investigating 
Subcommittee announced that it would conduct an appropriate inquiry 
into the tragedy to determine whether or not a more formal investi- 
gation might be warranted. Similarly, and on the same day, the 
Department of the Air Force, through action of the commander of 
the Air Defense Command, established a factfinding Board of Officers 
to investigate the tower’s collapse. Although this board was some- 
what delayed in its deliberations by the illness of a material witness, 
it nevertheless completed its field investigation late in February and 
thereafter rendered its report to Air Force Headquarters. 
Meanwhile, discussions had taken place between the chairman of 
the Preparedness Subcommittee and Air Force officials concerning 
the extent to which information acquired by the Board of Officers 
might be made available to the subcommittee in aid of its inquiry. 
It appeared from those discussions that the Air Force would be re- 
luctant to reveal any of its information until such time as all Air 
Force proceedings concerning the tower’s collapse were finally ter- 
minated. Consequently, the chairman directed the staff to conduct its 
own independent field investigation, which took place during the 
early part of March 1961. 
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