238 SEA GRANT COLLEGES 



national power and in public policj^ as it relates to science and tech- 

 nology. At present, I am completing a book, entitled "Technological 

 Change and the Balance of Power, 1870." Besides analyzing techno- 

 logical trends as they have aft'ected the distribution of international 

 power in the past, this study attempts to project these trends into the 

 future, and to explore their implications for American policy, both 

 national and international. 



Marme sciences and technologies have occupied a prominent place 

 in my professional interest in the impact of science and technology 

 on modem societies. In the late 1950's, I spent 3 years on the faculty 

 of the Naval War College, where, inevitably, the role of seapower — 

 to use the term in a broad sense, which is not confined t,o its strictly 

 military meaning — was a central consideration in my work. The re- 

 search on my book and my consultanship to the Navy Department 

 further sharpened my focus on the potential of marine sciences and 

 technologies. In general, I believe that they present the most promis- 

 ing single frontier for the development of America's power and vital- 

 ity in the future. 



Before I address myself specifically to S. 2439, I would like to say 

 a few words on why I consider the oceans and exploitation of their po- 

 tential through marine sciences and technologies of great importance 

 to this Nation. I hope this will clarifj^ my views on the proposed 

 legislation and will help to explain the amendments which I would 

 like to suggest. 



A convenient way of examining the promise of the oceans' poten- 

 tial is to place it in a historical perspective. When viewed in this 

 light, there is nothing novel in the oceans providing a principal means 

 to a nation's power and vitality. During most of the 19th century. 

 Great Britain dominated world politics through seapower — and here 

 again I am using this term in both its military and nonmilitary mean- 

 ing. In that period, the ship was the only truly effective mstrument 

 of mobility. By capitalizing on the development of her navy and mer- 

 chant marine. Great Britain achieved two things: Militarily, she was 

 capable of projecting her armed forces to any point on the globe and 

 of achieving a local victory before the landpower concerned was capa- 

 ble of mobilizing its own military might to repulse the enemy. Eco- 

 nomically, the British possessed a decisive commercial advantage inas- 

 much as, in those days, the merchant marine was by far the most 

 significant instrument of trade. 



The most important single reason for the decline of Britain's pre- 

 dominant position in the world was the development of overland trans- 

 portation, which deprived Great Britain of her special advantage in 

 mobility. The principal technological instruments in this regard 

 were the steam railroad and, later, the automobile. Armed with new 

 mobility, land powers were now capable of mobilizing their resources 

 and throwing them into the battle within weeks, if not days, and could 

 thus repulse the limited sea-transported forces of Great Britain. ^ 



Even more significantly, overland transportation possessed a major 

 economic advantage in developing resources located in hinterland areas 

 hitherto inaccessible to effective exploitation. When a merchant ship 

 sails between London and New York, she exchanges commodities be- 

 tween these two cities and contributes to their and their environs' eco- 

 nomic growth. On the other hand, when a train moves between New 



