392 NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM LEGISLATION 



The International Law Ciommission began a study of this subject at its first 

 meeting (in 1947) and brought out reasonably comprehensive reports and recom- 

 mendations in time for consideration by the 1954 General Assembly. 



At the 1954 General Assembly the Department of State felt confident that it 

 could get agreement on the key change it wanted in the law of the sea — that 

 the Continental Shelf and its contained resources would appertain to the adja- 

 cent coastal country without changing the character of the superjacent waters 

 as high seas. In this aspiration it was sadly disappointed because at this point 

 it ran headlong into the fishery problem which it did not then, and still scarcely 

 does, think to be of much consequence. 



THE FISHERY PROBLEM 



The fishery problem is exceedingly complex. It has been considered in detail 

 by other authors and I will treat it in an oversimplified manner here expecting 

 that the serious student will go to the extensive literature for more intense 

 inquiry. In the context of the conditions of 1954 the following aspects of this 

 complicated problem were politically active : 



(1) Iceland lived from the ocean. Well over 90 percent of its gross national 

 products came from the ocean. It sold this product primarily in Europe, whose 

 fishermen also came to fish in the Icelandic sea area. Iceland wished to exclude 

 these European fishermen from these grounds in order to improve both the fish- 

 ing opportunities of its own fishermen there, and their market opportunities 

 in Europe. 



Under ordinary conditions such a position would have appeared to be impos- 

 sible of attainment but the mid-1950's were not ordinary times. The cold war 

 struggle was at its peak. Keflavik Airport in Iceland was then absolutely re- 

 quired for the quick transport of fighter planes (and other airborne material) 

 from the arsenal of North America to the possible theater of war in Europe. 

 The fjords of Iceland were ideal as bases for submarines to be used in inter- 

 dicting surface commerce between North America and Europe if that were de- 

 sired. Accordingly in the mid-1950's Iceland had an extremely valuable bar- 

 gaining position between Eastern Europe and the NATO allies on its aspect 

 of the fishery problems. It set out to exploit this bargaining position with great 

 skill and force. 



(2) Japan was just then coming back in the good graces of the comity of 

 nations under the strong tutelage and sponsorship of the United States. The 

 United States required, at that stage of history, a strong bastion on the 

 eastern side of the Communist land mass (Japan) just as eagerly as it did 

 on the western side of it (Western Europe). At that stage of history Japan 

 was almost as dependent upon the sea fisheries as was Iceland. The dif- 

 ference between these two key allies, was, however, diametric. Iceland wanted 

 everybody else to stop fishing in her sea area; Japan wished to fish in all 

 sea areas. 



(3) The key Latin American countries in this imbroglio at this stage of 

 history did not have considerable fishing industries but wanted them in order 

 to improve their economies. They conceived that if they could attain sov- 

 ereignty over the fishing grounds in the high seas off their coasts they could — 



(a) Derive taxes from the fisheries by other nations off their coast: and 

 (6) By a judicious use of the taxing and other powers inherent in 



sovereignty, induce the rapid development of fishing industries in their 



countries by capture if not by other means. 



(4) Aside from being caught in severe diplomatic squeezes amongst its 

 allies in these controversies, the Department of State found itself in just as 

 tight, and just as violent, domestic political difficulties. The Pacific North- 

 west salmon and halibut fisheries wished to keep Japanese from fishing salmon 

 and halibut on the high seas, and especially in the eastern Pacific. The Cali- 

 fornia tuna fishermen made substantially all of their catches in the high seas 

 off western Latin America and wished to continue doing so. The gulf coast 

 shrimp fishermen made a considerable part of their catches off Latin America 

 and wished to continue doing so. The New England fishermen were being 

 squeezed out of their own market by imports of Icelandic fish and were then 

 fishing the Grand Banks and Nova Scotia banks off Canada. They did not wish 

 to assist Iceland further in the market and they did not wish to give Canada 

 excuses to exclude them from the Continental Shelf fisheries off the Maritime 

 Provinces and Newfoundland (which had recently become a part of Canada). 



All four of these groups were vigorously active politically in the United 



