NATIONAL OCEAN'OGRAPHIC PROGRAM LEGISLATION 395 



ithirds majority to win on substantive issne ; one-third plus one vote can block 

 .the adoittion of a substantive measure. 



Russia, in tlie period 19r)U-G(), with its captive and allied bloc votes, could 

 not get a blocking one-third of the votes. At this juncture of history, however, 

 came the Suez incident and the rallying of an Arab bloc devoted not necessarily 

 in favor of the Soviets, but against Israel. For reasons too long t<i go Into here 

 the League of Arab States felt that a 12-mile limit for the tei-ritorial sea would 

 aid their effort to strangle Israel ec(niomically. The Aral) blnc pins the Soviet 

 bloc votes added together comprised almost a blocking third for the Conference, 

 Russia required to pick up only another two or three dissident votes and then 

 wait for history to take its course. 



THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1958 AND 1960 



Over this issue the two United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea 

 of 195S and 1960 were fought. From the first Conference four excellent treaties 

 emerged which codified almost the whole of the law of the sea. These were: 

 Convention on the High Seas, Convention on the Territorial Sea, Convention 

 on the Continental Shelf, and Convention on Fishing, and Conservation of the 

 Living Resources of the High Seas. They form an admirable framework of in- 

 ternational law for administering public order on the ocean, as far as they go. 

 They have been undergoing, since 1958, the time-consuming process of obtaining 

 sufficient ratifications to come into force. The first three treaties had obtained 

 sufficient ratifications for this purpose by 1964 and are in force. The fourth 

 requires four more ratifications to come into force and this should happen 

 during 1965 or early 1966. They can be taken as presently representing the law 

 of the sea. 



The Convention on the Continental Shelf, by coming into force in 1964, finally 

 ^accomplished the U.S. policy on the resources of the subsoil of the Continental 

 Shelf enunciated by President Truman in 1945, and put into domestic law by the 

 Congress in the Submerged Lands Act, and the Outer Continental Shelf Act of 

 1954. This did not, however, quiet the diplimatic, military, fishing, and domestic 

 political hornet's nest which the original proclamation nearly 20 years ago had 

 stirred up. 



The 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea left two issues unresolved : 

 («•) The breadth of the territorial sea ; and 



(&) The limits of control by the coastal State over the fisheries in the 

 high seas off their coast. 



These issues were partially resolved. The International Law Commission, 

 in its 1956 session, had said that these limits lay between 3 and 12 miles, that 

 any limit beyond that was outside international law, but that between those 

 two ranges there was no agreed limit binding upon nations. The 1958 Conference 

 was unable to agree on these issues because of conflicts over the fishery problem. 

 The abstention issue and the 200-mile issue had been killed but whether the 

 fishery limit was to be 3 or 12 miles, or somewhere in between, could not get 

 a tw^o-thirds vote at the 1958 Conference any better than could the territorial 

 sea limit, and the latter lost its chance because of the residual conflicts over the 

 former. The only thing that happened on these issues were clear votes over- 

 whelmingly in favor of no limits in either instance beyond 12 marine miles in 

 breadth. Both Russia and the LTnited States were in favor of that. 



These two issues could not be resolved in the 1958 General Assembly either 

 and it established the Second Geneva Law of the Sea Conference for 1960 to 

 consider just these two issues. 



At this conference the whole of the diplomatic forces of Russia and the United 

 States were opposed to each other headlong. The petroleum-Continental Shelf 

 issue was out of the way ; the bulk of the law of the sea was codified, agreed to, 

 and not at issue ; the flsheries interest was completely submerged by the super- 

 vening military-diplomatic issues in the positions of both the principal com- 

 batants. The issue at all times was desperately close as to whether the United 

 States could obtain a two-thirds vote for a narrower territorial sea than 12 

 miles, or whether Russia and its allies could obtain a blocking third of the votes 

 and prevent any agreement. 



In its vigorous and desperate sti-uggle for votes the United States compromised, 

 step by step, until both its fishery and naval interests would have been seriously 

 compromised had the final compromises been acceptable. The United States was 

 prepared to accept a 6-mile limit for the territorial sea in the last analysis in 



