NATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHIC PROGRAM LEGISLATION 409 



In the consideration of the numerous bills presently before the committee 

 dealing with the organization of ocean affairs in the Federal Government, we 

 are once more engaged in the preparatory phases of an attack on a new en- 

 vironment, the ocean, designed to conquer it and render it more useful to the 

 Nation and to man. 



Here the possible advantages to the Nation are as enormous as was the con- 

 quest of the arid environment of the Great Plains, at least as great as the 

 conquest of the environment of the lower atmosphere, and on the surface of 

 things, at least, more obvious than those that will result from the conquest of 

 nearby space. 



Here, again, however we are at the point where we were in 1840 on the move 

 westward. The weapons, tools, ideas, and institutions which we have developed 

 for the successful occupation and use of the continent, the lower atmosphere, and 

 nearby space are not suited to a successful occupation and use of this new en- 

 vironment — the ocean. New weapons, tools, ideas, and institutions require to be 

 developed to insure the successful occupation and use of this new environment. 



In our previous examples of this sort massive initial assistance has been 

 required from the Federal Government. I do not think that anyone acquainted 

 with this ocean problem doubts that massive assistance from the Federal Govern- 

 ment also will be needed in the initial stages of learning how to occupy and use 

 more fully the ocean. The question we are concerned with is not that, but is 

 how much, in what form, and with M'hat urgency of timing this Government 

 activity should be undertaken. Perhaps the last point might be considered 

 first. 



THE STEATEGIO CONSIDERATION 



The attitude of the United States toward the ocean has vacillated between 

 wide extremes in our short history, not once but several times. At one extreme, 

 sea power and sea use is the driving objective of Government and citizenry 

 alike ; at the other extreme, the ocean and its use is practically ignored. 



Whatever the contemporary attitude of government and citizenry the one 

 incoutestible fact that stands out in this history, and in our present posture, 

 is that the ocean and its uses control the power position of the United States in 

 the world whether we see this or ignore it at the moment. The control and use 

 of the ocean is the difference between the life and death of our society, our 

 economy, and our way of life. In our control, in neutral control, or in, the con- 

 trol of a friendly power, the ocean provides a necessary highway among us 

 and our friends ; in enemy or unfriendly control, it forms a wall cutting us off 

 from friends and things necessary for our survival. 



These strategic considerations have been well known for a long time and are 

 adequately set down in the writings of Admiral Mahan and others. As a matter 

 of fact, while the geographic parameters have enlarged, the strategic considera- 

 tions of a seapower versus a landpower were as well set down by Thucydides 

 in the fourth century B.C. as they ever have been since. 



The trouble is that we know all this, but when things get peaceful we get 

 busy with other problems and forget it. Our land resources are so great, our 

 economy is so strong, our military prowess is so over^vhelming, our progress 

 in space is so stimulating, that it is easy to lose sight of the harsh, cold fact that 

 the ocean connects much of these things together and that the control and use 

 of the ocean is our strenght or our weakness. 



In the la.st analysis, however, when the United. States is faced with the possi- 

 bility of the control and use of the ocean falling into unfriendlv hands it will 

 fight. It always has done so, and it always must do so. When England sought 

 to control absolutely the maritime commerce of the Colonies, they revolted, be- 

 came a nation, and fought England again in 1812 when again she attempted 

 to dominate O'ur ocean commerce. In between these two wars the embryonic 

 U.S. Navy was sent to crush the Barbary pirates who were harassing our 

 ocean trade. The issue which finally brought us into World War I was the fear 

 that Germany would win control of the Atlantic shipping lanes. The issue that 

 finally brought us into World War II was again the fear of Germany domirating 

 the Atlantic sealanes, and at last the crushing blow of Japan against our 

 seapower at Pearl Harbor. 



Nuclear Aveapons have in no manner changed this strategic consideration. 

 They have the power only to postpone the final decision and to escalate the 

 final holocaust. 



53-367—^5 ^27 



