282 



241, 58 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d. 258; Katzenhach v. Mc- 

 Clung, 1964, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290. 



A nice argument can be contrived that the net ef- 

 fect of these provisions was to vest in the adjacent 

 states [1] title in these tldelands and their natural 

 resources and [2] [a] the exclusive power to use, 

 exploit and manage these lands [b] only subject to 

 the reserved power of the Federal government regard- 

 ing (i) navigation, (ii) flood control, and (iii) produc- 

 tion of power. Certainly, this brief synopsds of (1) and 

 (2) (a) is the literal import of §1311 (a) (1) (2). Like- 

 wise, the reservation summarized as (2) (b) is literally 

 specified in § 1311 (d). On this approach, the Federal 

 Government turned over to adjacent states the full 

 management and use of the tidelands reserving only 

 those limited powers over commerce comprehended 

 within the three particulars. 



But this argument ignores both language found else- 

 where and the legislative purpose of the Act. The con- 

 troversy, often pressed with emotional overtones, was 

 over oil and gas and v/hether the states were to reap 

 the economic benefits of development royalties and 

 to regulate the exploration and development or wheth- 

 er these benefits and these controls were to be exer- 

 cised by the Federal Government as an adjunct of 

 then newly declared "paramount" rights". United 

 States V. Calijornia, 1947, 332 U.S. 804, 805, 68 S.Ct. 

 20, , 92 L.Ed. 302, 383. The Act and this relinquish- 

 ment reflect the legislative compromise found in the 

 combination of the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer 



