289 



United States, 1925, 266 U.S. 405, 45 S.Ct. 176, 69 L.Ed. 

 352; Wisconsin v. Illinois, 1929, 278 U.S. 367, 49 S.Ct. 

 163, 73 L.Ed. 426; United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 

 1960, 362 U.S. 482, 80 S.Ct. 884, 4 L.Ed.2d 903. 



One very big exception is United States ex rel. Great- 

 house V. Bern, 1933, 289 U.S. 352, 53 S.Ct. 614, 77 L.Ed. 

 1250. There petitioners sought a writ of mandamus 

 to compel the Secretary of War and the Chief of En- 

 gineers to issue a permit to build a wharf in navigable 

 waters. The Secretary, specifically finding that it 

 would not interfere with navigation, denied the permit. 

 The Supreme Court held that mandamus would not 

 issue because the allowance of mandamus "is con- 

 trolled by equitable principles * * * and it may be re- 

 fused for reasons comparable to those which would 

 lead a Court of equity, in the exercise of a sound dis- 

 cretion, to withhold its protection of an undoubted legal 



waters is limited to control for navigation. By navi- 

 gation respondent means no more than operation of 

 boats and improvement of the waterway itself. In 

 truth the authority of the United States is the regu- 

 lation of commerce on its waters. Navigability, in the 

 sense just stated, is but a part of this whole. Flood 

 protection, watershed development, recovery of the 

 cost of improvements through utilization of power 

 are likewise parts of commerce control. * * * That 

 authority is as broad as the needs of conunerce. * * * 

 The point is that navigable waters are subject to na- 

 tional planning and control in the broad regulation of 

 commerce giauted the Federal Government. The li- 

 cense conditions to which objection is made have an 

 obvious relationship to the exercise of the commerce 

 power. Even if there were no such relationship the 

 plenary power of Congress over navigable waters 

 would empower it to deny the privilege of construct- 

 ing an obstruction in those waters." 



