550 



view, emphasizing traditional processes of mineral 

 claim on and under a sea-bed held to be res millius. 

 Some are willing to make concessions on an inter- 

 national registry or towards cooperation in pollution 

 and security. On the other hand, Young (1968), 

 Krueger (1968), and Eichelberger (1968), hasten to 

 point out that the flag approach is but a form of neo- 

 coloniahsm which would rapidly lead to a gold-rush. 

 Nor does the flag approach, with its unavoidable 

 competitive nature, make much sense ecologically. 



The last alternative is 'international'. Kruger (1968) 

 and Eichelberger (1968) lucidly point out the obsole- 

 scence of nationalism and the fact that most small 

 nations will view internationahsm as the only legitimate 

 approach to the sea. Furthermore, mineral resources 

 required by the industrial nations are spread throughout 

 the international market, necessitating international 

 trade. 



The United Nations has shown its resolve by a series 

 of resolutions. One of 31 December 1968, designated 

 Resolution 2467A-2467D (XXIII), includes the 

 following points: (1) promotion of international co- 

 operation; (2) exploitation for the benefit of mankind; 

 (3) prevention of pollution ; (4) desirability of peaceful 

 use of the sea-bed; and (5) endorsement of an Inter- 

 national Decade of Ocean Exploration. 



I find it impossible to argue against any of these 

 goals, and equally impossible to see an alternative to 

 internationahsm in achieving any of them. Precedents 

 of treaties on Antarctica and outer space exist though 

 both Young (1968) and Eichelberger (1968) point out 

 that the ocean floor is not tabula rasa (i.e. a 'blank 

 slate') as were in some senses both Antarctica and outer 

 space. However, they do not point out that virtually 

 all of Antarctica was under territorial claim, and that 

 nuclear testing and exploration had been carried on 

 in outer space before those treaties were signed. Both 

 treaties involved a yielding of claims and nulhfications 

 of miUtary interests. It is difficult to see why such 

 yielding could not also take place for the sea-floor, 

 the superjacent waters, and even some sections of 

 shelf. One thing is certain; under no reasonable 

 circumstances would the exploiter lose by international 

 control. All that might ensue would be more efficient 

 utilization and a cleaner sea. 



Gargantuan problems exist with regard to inter- 

 nationahsm. Burke (1966a, 19666, 1968, 1969), 

 Alexander (1966), and Griffin (1967), review the 

 problems of disarmament, bilateral and multilateral 

 agreements, the extent of off-shore claims, scientific 

 freedom in research, and many others. Burke (1969), 

 particularly, examines difficulties in applying the 

 Stratton Commission Report. However, one should 

 not be deterred from a path simply because it is 

 stony. 



CONCLUSION 



The sea lies today like a huge plum which Man is 

 ready to pluck but towards which he gropes in 

 quandary. This paper emphasizes the application of 

 ecology to this Marine Revolution. We see that 

 historically we have grown to treat the sea as the 

 land — exploitively and as a 'frontier' to be conquered. 

 There is no longer room for doubt that this is a 

 collision course and that the 'conquest' of Nature 

 threatens Man's existence as a species with high 

 'culture'. 



Much as we might wish it so, the sea is not a placebo 

 for our destruction of the land. The very existence of 

 Conventions on the sea are cause for optimism and 

 proof of awareness of the need for change. To the 

 international lawyers belongs most of the credit. 

 However, there persist such items as the 'house' 

 lawyer's fear of loss of proprietary rights, the indus- 

 trialist's fear of loss of claim, and the fisherman's fear 

 of loss oilaissez faire exploitation. Many maintain that 

 we do not yet know enough about the sea, nor do we 

 have sufficient experience with it, to change our modus 

 operandi. Nevertheless, one must agree with Belman 

 (1968): 'If law awaits developments, it loses the 

 ability to shape them.' 



The ecosystem principle must serve as the over- 

 riding guide for shaping our future resource use. We 

 simply do not dare exceed limits of homeostasis in the 

 sea. Ripley (1966) states: 'The basic problem therefore 

 is to acquire sufficient knowledge about our eco- 

 systems to provide feedback controls essential to 

 homeostasis.' It is true that we do not as yet have all 

 the knowledge we might desire, but it is also true that 

 we know enough now to be able intelhgently to 

 monitor our actions. We can assume that every one of 

 our actions puts some stress on the environment. We 

 can put aside expediency, tradition, and false economic 

 idols. We can negate ffimsy and obsolescent national 

 boundaries. We can shift the burden of proof for 

 ecological damage from the plaintiff-community to 

 the defendent-exploiter. The problem is not the 

 ability to change; it is the desire and necessary under- 

 standing. 



A new brand of environmental biologist must 

 become increasingly involved in the Marine Revolu- 

 tion; without him, no purely pohtical or legal solution 

 will suffice. Non-biologists, even lay conservationists, 

 have too rarely shown comprehension of the com- 

 plexities of the living world and they are not equipped 

 to deal with the sophistication of ecosystem ecology. 

 However, the biologists have been largely unwilling 

 to commit themselves. Darhng (1967) has pinpointed 

 part of the problem: '. . . public policy has to be 

 ahead of pubhc consensus. . . ecology and conservation 



