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nine seats; each interest group whose representation is required 

 would designate its own representatives. The United States, either 

 as the probable largest investor in deep-seabed mining — one of the 

 represented interest groups — or as the largest importer or consum- 

 er of deep-seabed minerals — a second interest group — would have 

 as much practical assurance of being named to one of these groups 

 as would the Soviet Union of being named as one of the Eastern 

 bloc representatives. 



Three, that the U.S. companies would be required to sell sensi- 

 tive national-security-related technology. On the contrary, the U.S. 

 Government would presumably deny an export license for any such 

 sale. The text provides that "nothing in this convention shall be 

 deemed to require a State Party, in the fulfillment of its obliga- 

 tions under the relevant provisions of this convention, to supply 

 information, the disclosure of which is contrary to the essential 

 interests of its security." 



Four, that a company seeking an ocean-mining contract would be 

 required to transfer its technology without adequate compensation. 

 In fact, the technology-transfer obligation applies "only if the en- 

 terprise finds that it is unable to obtain the same or equally 

 efficient and useful technology on the open market" and then only 

 on "fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions," subject 

 to binding commercial arbitration of any dispute as to those terms 

 and conditions. In passing, I would note that a number of compa- 

 nies have already come forward with offers of seabed mining sys- 

 tems to the future enterprise. 



Five, that national liberation movements like the PLO would be 

 eligible to share in the net revenues of the Authority. Although 

 "activities in the area," — those would, of course, include deep- 

 seabed mining — under the jurisdiction of the Authority are to be 

 conducted on a basis talking into consideration the interests of 

 "peoples who have not obtained full independence or other self- 

 governing status," the sharing of economic benefits can only be 

 carried out in accordance with regulations in which we must 

 concur. We shall, therefore, be in a position to prevent the PLO 

 from being eligible. 



Fortunately, Mr. Chairman, the attacks on the text have a posi- 

 tive aspect. They help to point up the remarkable fact that so little 

 of this extraordinarily complex document is the subject of contro- 

 versy. They also invite their own refutation by the kind of retort I 

 have just made; namely, that the text does not say — or was not 

 intended to say — what the critic has alleged. And where the criti- 

 cism cannot wholly be disposed of by a fair reading of the existing 

 text, it identifies an opportunity to make the language conform 

 with its intent. 



In the case, for example, of U.S. membership on the Council of 

 the Authority, the provision for the selection by each interest 

 group of its own representatives was put forward by the U.S. 

 delegation last year in the belief that this would solve the problem. 

 It was accepted by the Group of 77 with the same understanding. 

 Having thus in substance already acquiesced in a "guaranteed seat 

 for the United States," it is likely that the 77 would now agree to 

 make the guarantee more explicit. 



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