32 



to comment on whether a review of past negotiations is automati- 

 cally sought when there is a change of administration? 



Mr. Richardson. Certainly, Mr. Chairman, this degree of auto- 

 maticity is not visible in the conduct of negotiations by other 

 countries as a general rule. 



There have been, of course, many changes of governments 

 around the world, even during the 4 years in which I have been 

 associated with the negotiations, and I am not aware of any in- 

 stance in which another country has sought to delay the negotia- 

 tions or has indeed significantly changed its negotiating position 

 because of the change of government. 



The presumed explanation for this is that the national interests 

 at stake in each country are so fundamental and so persisting that 

 they have been given a recognition transcending purely partisan 

 considerations. 



This, in turn, therefore, has accounted for the fact that a change 

 of party leadership of the Government has not resulted in a change 

 of negotiating positions. 



I do not on the other hand, want to be understood as questioning 

 the legitimacy of undertaking the review at this time, and indeed, 

 even the Law of the Sea Conference as a whole, as I noted at the 

 outset of my statement, has accepted that position. 



I am concerned, however, as to the depth of the review, and thus 

 as to the time that it may take. 



It does seem to me that there ought to be some fundamental 

 premises, premises that have guided every administration since 

 Johnson, that ought relatively quickly to be capable of review and 

 assessment in order then to be able to address the question of how 

 to improve the treaty at Geneva, and it does seem to me the 

 negotiating session in Geneva may well afford an opportunity for 

 the United States to obtain improvements in the treaty, or at least 

 to initiate that process which may not be available at a later date 

 after the United States has curdled the atmosphere by another 

 foot-dragging performance. 



Chairman Zablocki. You have stated also in the opening part of 

 your testimony that the Conference as a whole has exhibited nota- 

 bly tolerant understanding of the need for the United States to 

 carry on a review. 



However, would the Conference have a tolerant understanding of 

 the United States if the review is not completed by August, and 

 what is likely to happen at the Conference if the United States is 

 not ready to negotiate substance by that time? 



Mr. Richardson. I am concerned about this, Mr. Chairman. 



I can't make a completely confident forecast, of course. 



I am concerned, as I indicated, that a negative reaction would 

 make the Conference less receptive at a later date to whatever 

 amendments we then seek. 



I am also concerned that the Conference might insist upon "for- 

 malizing" the text, which would mean that the document now 

 referred to as "Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea" (Informal 

 Text), would become a formal text. That would mean, then, that for 

 the first time the Conference operated under its rules, and under 

 the rules, changes in the text can only be made by amendment. 



