38 



time we are involved in long running negotiations— whether the 

 Panama Canal, the Law of the Sea, or these communications con- 

 ventions, how do we reconcile the views of the new administration 

 and how much is the new administration held responsible for what 

 has gone on before? 



How do you do this without starting from scratch? Would you 

 give me your thoughts? 



Mr. Richardson. I don't have any easy answer to that, Mr. 

 Pritchard. The shift of ideological content of the national leader- 

 ship from the previous administration to this administration was 

 certainly more marked in degree than has occurred in any recent 

 election that I can think of. 



This has, therefore, made the problem somewhat more difficult 

 than it would be ordinarily. 



We are a country which to a larger extent than most others — 

 than other democratic countries — changes the leadership of execu- 

 tive branch departments. There are reasons under our system for 

 doing this. Undoubtedly in this kind of context we do pay a price. 



I encounter among colleagues in the Law of the Sea Conference, 

 including people who in their own countries and Foreign Ministers, 

 Ministers of Justice, representatives to the U.N., a considerable 

 degree of dismay on this'score. 



It has raised exactly the question you have touched on. How can 

 we know when we negotiate in the United States whether any 

 understanding reached is going to survive? 



It does suggest the possible desirability of some kind of consulta- 

 tive mechanism that would help. One might have thought in this 

 case that the fact that the basic elements of the U.S. position had 

 been laid down in the beginning of the Nixon administration, had 

 been maintained without change under Ford and Carter, that all 

 the heads of the U.S. delegation had been Republicans, that we had 

 an advisory committee broadly representative as previously de- 

 scribed, and that we had had constant consultations and hearings 

 with the Congress, like this one, would have minimized these risks. 



I can only hope that the result of the review will be to reaffirm 

 earlier positions. The realities have not changed. Four Presidents, 

 four Secretaries of State, seven Secretaries of Defense — I don't 

 know how many chairmen and members of the Joint Chiefs of 

 Staff — have all come out with the same conclusions during all the 

 years since 1966 in which these issues have been addressed. 



As I say, since the realities have not in fact changed, one would 

 hope they will have the same penetrating power in due course that 

 they have had in the past. 



Mr. Pritchard. May I ask one short question? 



Chairman Zablocki. Yes. 



Mr. Pritchard. Is there any country which is sympathetic to the 

 adminstration's desire to conduct a complete review of these nego- 

 tiations, or feels it is legitimate for us to take more than 9 months 

 to come to a conclusion? 



You have dealt with these countries. What is their attitude? 



Mr. Richardson. I couldn't prove a negative. I don't know that 

 there are any. All I can say is if there is any I haven't encountered 

 it. 



Chairman Zablocki. Mrs. Fenwick. 



