43 



One thing that is not adequately understood about these negotia- 

 tions is that the interest of the United States is not simply in 

 having the power to transit straits or territorial or economic zones. 



It is to gain the right to do so under universally accepted rules. 

 Because the United States has political relationships with every 

 country, we cannot afford merely in order to assure the transit of 

 our tankers without harassment by coastal state environmental 

 rules, to incur cumulative political ill will. 



We don't want to have to count the costs every time we send a 

 carrier task force through the Java Sea. 



This is why as a superpower we need rules. It is not sufficient for 

 us to say, "We are on the right side of the issue. We don't recognize 

 the extention of the territorial sea 3 miles or 12. Therefore, we 

 insist that there is still a high seas lane through the Strait of 

 Lombok or the Strait of Malacca." 



But if there are 120 other countries that say, "We don't agree 

 with you, we believe that the 12-mile territorial sea has now 

 become assimilated into customary international law," then, if we 

 defy that position, we do so at cumulative political cost. 



I could elaborate. Bilateral negotiations are expensive. A bargain 

 is a bargain. You can't assume that representatives of the United 

 States will always be able successfully to overreach the representa- 

 tives of little countries. It doesn't work that way. 



Bargains in which we gain excessive advantages are inherently 

 unstable. The result, therefore, is that we have benefited in many 

 instances unrecognized by the American Heritage Foundation by 

 broad multilateral agreements under which we don't have to keep 

 bargaining. 



This, by the way, is a respect in which the American Heritage 

 Foundation is fundamentally off base with regard to economic aid. 



We should be in a position to have sufficient bilateral aid re- 

 sources so that we can, through bilateral aid agreements, factor in 

 political considerations. 



The United States has an interest in the economic development 

 of the sub-Saharan and Sahel on humanitarian and moral grounds 

 as well as other considerations such as a long-term concern with 

 global stability. This interest is unaffected by whatever political 

 advantages we can extract by squeezing some concession out of the 

 Central African Republic. 



There are uses of multilateral institutions because they are mul- 

 tilateral that cannot be obtained through bilateral negotiations. 



I think this is a matter that becomes clearer the more closely it 

 is examined. 



Mr. Dornan. Thank you for that thoughtful answer. My time 

 has run out. 



If I could just say in concluding that I think human patience 

 always reaches a breaking point and I hope after putting so many 

 years into this effort you stay with it in the area of unofficial 

 guidance so that those of us who believe the administration is 

 making a mistake in taking so much time to reevaluate the matter, 

 they should be well aware of how generous you were in your 

 immediate analysis of the new administration's right to take an- 

 other look at this. 



