14 



The U.S. Army Chief of Staff, commented in a March 26, 1981, 



letter, 1 



I agree with you that the U.S. security interests, among others, are an important 

 aspect to the emerging treaty and should be carefully considered in that regard. 



The generally accepted consensus is that the trend in customary international 

 laws to restrict free transit of the oceans by expansion of the territorial sea from 

 three to twelve nautical miles. This expansion of the territorial sea would close 116 

 straits to navigation, except innocent passage, which does not include submerged 

 transit or overflight. 



The draft treaty would appear to preserve the right of submerged transit and 

 overflight through these key straits through a new regime called transit passage. A 

 similar new regime could also preserve navigational overflight rights through archi- 

 pelagos, another area in which there is a trend in customary international law 

 toward restriction of free passage. On balance it appears that an international 

 standard codifying such freedom would be desirable. 



We hear from the mining companies that they are prepared to 

 make further substantial investment, but need a treaty out there 

 in order to protect themselves. They don't want the gunboats 

 coming up and interrupting their work. We hear from the scientific 

 community that they want to move ahead. 



Where are you getting the opposition that requires such an 

 unduly and lengthy review process? Is there some opposition that 

 has arisen in the Congress or from some source that we are not 

 aware of? 



Mr. Malone. Congressman Gilman, there has been concern, cer- 

 tainly, from a number of quarters within the Congress. Our evalua- 

 tion at the moment was that on the Senate side the draft text 

 would not be accepted for ratification. Here, indeed, on your own 

 House, on December 10, a group of 14 Congressmen, several mem- 

 bers of this committee included, wrote to then-President-elect 

 Reagan requesting a very complete, thorough, and detailed review. 



I think that within our national security structure at the Depart- 

 ment of Defense there have been concerns raised that we want to 

 look at very carefully. Obviously, the letter from the Air Force 

 which you just read will be something that will be carefully and 

 closely evaluated, but it does not express necessarily what the 

 ultimate view of either the Department of Defense, as a whole, or 

 the Joint Chiefs will be. 



There are many opinions that we must consider very, very care- 

 fully. I have recognized this view that has been expressed by this 

 particular service and we will consider it carefully, but we have 

 many other views to factor in, as well. 



Again, I have to return to the statement that I have previously 

 made that all of this, of course, to really be done carefully and 

 completely, is going to take us quite a bit of time. 



Mr. Gilman. Well, we hope that lengthy review isn't going to 

 result in some dire consequences and that it will unravel what 

 good has been done to date and that we will be able to move ahead. 



I might note that a number of members of this committee includ- 

 ing our good chairman, joined together in a letter to Secretary of 

 State Haig urging that we get on with the job and that the review 

 not be unduly prolonged. That was a letter dated March 6, 1981. As 

 you recall, I handed a copy of that letter to you personally during 



'For text of letters see appendixes 5-7, pp. 101-103. 



