prematurely to finalize a treaty that might fail to further our 

 national interests. 



Many comments were made by foreign delegates and in the U.S. 

 press about the manner in which we announced our decision to 

 conduct a policy review and to appoint a new chief negotiator. Let 

 me report to this committee that the decision to conduct the review 

 was made as rapidly as possible, consistent with the many burdens 

 and competing priorities faced by the new administration. 



A change in the leadership of the American delegation was 

 essential in order to insure that other countries clearly understood 

 our seriousness of purpose with respect to the review. That action 

 was also necessary in order to send the signal to other delegations 

 that the United States could not be induced to return immediately, 

 and thus prematurely, to the bargaining table by offers of minor 

 technical changes to the draft convention. 



I am sure that you can also appreciate that it would be less 

 difficult for a new head of delegation to adhere to a negotiating 

 posture that diverged from our past approach. 



The argument has been made by some that the United States is 

 failing to keep its commitments by reviewing its policy and possi- 

 bly changing its position on subjects of importance. This, in my 

 judgment, is an unconvincing argument. Shortly before the Carter 

 administration took office, leading representatives of the develop- 

 ing countries at the conference rejected treaty provisions they had 

 previously negotiated and demanded substantial changes to the 

 draft text then on the table as the price of future agreement. Those 

 delegates entertained the hope that more favorable concessions 

 could be extracted from a new administration which was thought 

 to be more sympathetic to developing country positions in U.N. 

 forums. 



It has always been well understood at the Law of the Sea Confer- 

 ence that a successful treaty must be based on a package deal. The 

 position that the administration will take toward the contents of 

 that package remains to be determined in the course of the review 

 process. No nation is committed to the text in the sense that it is 

 bound by it. 



In this regard I would like to quote from the Conference Presi- 

 dent's preparatory note to the draft convention, and I quote: 



This text, like its predecessor, will be informal in character. It is a negotiating 

 text and not a negotiated text, and does not prejudice the position of any delegation. 



Mr. Chairman, let me list for you some of the features of the 

 present draft convention which I referred to earlier as raising 

 concerns. They raise concerns because questions have been raised 

 whether these features are consistent with U.S. interests. 



I will not today seek to identify other features of the text which 

 have been considered to preserve or promote other U.S. interests. 

 This will be part of the review process. The areas of concern 

 include the following. 



The draft convention places under burdensome international reg- 

 ulation the development of all of the resources of the seabed and 

 subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, representing ap- 

 proximately two-thirds of the Earth's submerged lands. These re- 

 sources include polymetallic nodules. They also include mineral 

 deposits beneath the surface of the seabed about which nothing is 



