We look forward to your report on the 10th session of the Confer- 

 ence. 



Mr. Malone, you may proceed in any way you wish and, as you 

 are aware, after your testimony we may have some questions. 



STATEMENT OF JAMES MALONE, HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGA- 

 TION TO THE U.N. THIRD CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE 

 SEA AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE OF THE 

 BUREAU OF OCEANS, ENVIRONMENT AND SCIENTIFIC AF- 

 FAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY THEODORE G. KRONMILLER, 

 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR OCEANS AND FISHER- 

 IES 



Mr. Malone. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 



Before I proceed with my statement, I would like to introduce 

 the gentlemen on my right, who is Mr. Ted Kronmiller, the Deputy 

 Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries. Mr. Kronmiller is 

 with me this morning in his capacity as the head of our review 

 effort. 



Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be 

 given the opportunity to speak today about the recently concluded 

 session of the Law of the Sea Conference and the administration's 

 policy review process. 



I know that the Law of the Sea has long been of interest to your 

 committee. I would like to assure you at the outset that you and 

 other interested Members of the Congress will be fully consulted 

 during the course of this review. 



My statement will attempt to put into perspective this Adminis- 

 tration's approach to the Third United Nations Conference on the 

 Law of the Sea and the reasons why we adopted the decision to 

 slow down the negotiating process just as it may have been about 

 to finalize the draft convention text. 



Preparation for the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 

 of the Sea began, as is well known, in 1966. During the 15-year 

 history of these negotiations the United States has sought to pro- 

 tect U.S. oceans' interests and has pressed for urgent solutions to 

 what it perceived to be the problems of the Law of the Sea. 



The developing countries have approached the negotiations with 

 a different perspective and have sought economic concessions from 

 the industrialized world, chiefly in the deep seabed part of the 

 negotiations. Increasingly important compromises to developing 

 country interests were accepted by our negotiators in order to 

 achieve the protection of U.S. interests as they defined them. 



When this administration took office, it was confronted with an 

 informal draft convention on the Law of the Sea containing a 

 number of provisions raising concerns on which I shall elaborate 

 shortly. We were informed that the Conference was on the verge of 

 finalizing this text and that there was expectation that the negotia- 

 tions would conclude this year — 1981. 



Many of the provisions of the draft convention prompted sub- 

 stantial criticism from Congress, from industry, and from the 

 American public. There was also some question of whether this 

 draft convention was consistent with the stated goals of the Reagan 

 administration. Therefore, the administration decided that it would 

 be better to face criticism in the United Nations than to proceed 



