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REACTION TO US POLICY REVIEW 



The reaction to the U.S. policy review was characterized 

 by bewilderment and frustration. Many Conference participants 

 had believed that this would be the last negotiating session 

 of the Conference; those who were skeptical thought remaining 

 matters could be cleared up this summer in time for signature 

 in Caracas soon thereafter. 



The announcement of the U.S. review was followed by wide- 

 spread endorsement of the basic package embodied in the Draft 

 Convention as it stands by developing countries, the Soviet 

 bloc, and some Western countries. 



Three motivations appear to be prevalent in this reaction 

 among foreign delegates: 



1) A desire to conclude the treaty quickly. The reasons 

 for this range from fatigue and frustration with the length of 

 these negotiations and the need to show a tangible end product 

 to a concern that existing trends in the law of the sea toward 

 expansion of coastal state controls of navigation are prejudi- 

 cial to their national interests and may soon render the 

 existing provisions on navigational freedoms unratifiable by 

 coastal states. 



2) A desire to avoid making further concessions to the 

 United States with respect to deep seabed mining. 



3) A desire to avoid encouraging their own governments, 

 or third states, to reopen other matters in the Convention in 

 response to U.S. proposals for changes. 



No delegation seriously questioned the right of the U.S. 

 Government to carry out such a review. While some were annoyed 

 at its timing and our inability to give more notice, most were 

 much more concerned about the outcome. Thus, statements of 

 foreign delegations were characterized by efforts to affirm the 

 basic "package deal" as it stands and stress the difficulty of 

 considering any fundamental changes in that deal. Neverthe- 

 less, they stopped short of presenting the draft as it stands 

 on a "take it or leave it" basis, and were keenly aware of 

 the need to avoid provoking a sharp negative reaction to the 

 Convention. This led to numerous statements toward the end 

 of the session that the reservoir of good will for the United 

 States was not inexhaustible and that the United States should 

 not misinterpret moderation at this session as a sign of 

 weakness. 



The arguments- made stressed two basic themes. The first 

 was the issue of the credibility of U.S. participation in long- 

 term negotiations, in this case, negotiations that were begun 



