ol 
office’ ;* and the establishment of an international agency with the authority to 
grant leases and extract rents. While these are cast as distinct alternatives for 
the purposes of illustration, there is a wide range of solutions involving elements 
and combinations of each of the above to a greater or lesser degree. 
The range of solutions should be emphasized because of the tendency of the 
current debate to polarize between those advocating UN control and those fear- 
ing UN takeover. The advocates point out the need of the UN for an independent 
income. The opponents point to the weakness of the UN and its inability to deal 
with difficult issues of practical import. And more than a little emotion is gen- 
erated on both sides. I would like to suggest, however, that the UN is irrelevant. 
It exists, and it might well be used. But if it did not exist, we would still be 
faced by the problems of providing rules or a regime to govern the exploitation 
of the deep sea minerals. 
Much of the current debate also tends to oversimplify the questions of urgency 
and knowledge. “Some of us believe that the American objective, for the next 
several years, should be to keep all options open, and avoid premature commit- 
ments. Too little is known about these resources or the means of exploiting them, 
to justify great decisions.” ° This is plausible, but inexact. Certainly our know]l- 
edge was not particularly great when Truman proclaimed in 1945 that the re- 
sources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf contiguous to the United 
States were subject to its jurisdiction and control. The relevant question is one 
of the degree of knowledge with respect to the kind of decision. We may not know 
enough to write detailed laws and regulations, but it can be argued that we do 
know enough to seek the establishment of certain principles, such as security of 
investment, and that we know enough to avoid steps that may be detrimental to 
our long run interests. For example, a good case can be made, on the basis of 
present knowledge, for getting “rid of the exploitability concept, the rubber 
boundary notion, altogether.” ° And I think that a good case can be made for 
avoiding the conditions that plague international fisheries, where the “rule of 
capture” has led to gross physical and economic wastes.’ 
THE MINERALS OF THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR 
The two problems posed by the potential exploitations of minerals are the 
extent of the limits of the coastal state’s rights and the regime that will govern 
exploitation beyond those limits. In the first case, the rights are presently 
limited by the criterion of exploitability and by some ill-defined concept of 
propinquity.? The exploitability criterion, as already indicated, provides a 
31. F. BE. Goldie, ‘The Geneva Conventions”, in Lewis M. Alexander, ed., The Law of the 
Sea (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1967). vp. 2738-293. 
4Francis T. Christy, Jr., ‘Alternative Regimes for Minerals of the Sea Floor,” a paper 
presented at the American Bar Asssociation National Institute on Marine Resources, Long 
Beach, California, June 8. 1967. 
SEly, op. cit., p. 000. It might be noted that the Soviet motion placed before the Inter- 
national Oceanographic Council and referred to by Ely, has now been discussed by that 
body. As a result of that discussion, the IOC voted to concentrate on the conduct of scien- 
tific research and not on the exploitation of deep sea minerals. This particular motion, 
therefore, does not_add to the urgency of reaching a solution. More recently. the Maltese 
delegation to the UN introduced a note verbale dealing explicitly with the use and exploi- 
tation of the resources of the sea floor (UN General Assembly, 22nd Session, A/6695, 18 
August 1987). The ste which originally called for a treaty has been amended to call for 
ine estaplishinent of a study group. There is, thus. urgency for study and research. if not 
or Cecision. 
6 Bly, op. cit., p. 000. The rubber boundary may soon be stretched. ‘‘More recently, the 
Department (of the Interior) has indicated an assertion of jurisdiction beyond the 200 
meter line by publishing leasing maps for areas off the Southern California coast as far as 
100 mites from the mainland, at depths as great as 6.000 feet. Additionally. oil and gas 
leases have been issued in an area 30 miles off the Oregon coast in water as deep as 1.500 
feet.’ Frank J. Barry. Solicitor. Denartment of the Interior, “Administration of Laws for 
the Exploitation of Offshore Minerals in the United States and Abroad,” a paper presented 
at the American Bar Association National Institute on Marine Resources, Long Beach, 
California, June 9. 1967. { 
‘ See Christy, “The Distribution of the Seas’ Wealth in Fisheries,” in Lewis M. Alexander 
oa aie Law of the Sea (Columbus. Ohio: The Ohio State University Press, 1967). pp. 
_ > See N. 6, supra. It has been argued that it was not the intention of the Convention to 
limit the extension of exclusive rights by some concept of propinquity. ‘‘The objective of 
the Convention on the Continental Shelf was to divide the beds of the seas among the 
coastal nations for that was the real need if future conflicts were to be avoided.” Bern- 
feld, op. cit., p. 72. Griffin, to the contrary. states that “‘the literal open-endedness of the 
Convention’s exploitability test has caused erroneous assertions that it allocates the sea 
bottom underlying entire oceans.’ William lL. Griffin, “The Emerging Law of Ocean 
Space,” 1. The International Lawyer, p. 573, Griffin further states that “propinquity is 
the basis for allocating to the coastal states sovereign rights in the seabed and subsoil of 
internal waters, territorial sea, and the continental shelf. The juridical shelf terminates 
where propinquity terminates.” ibid.. p. 585. 
