I. Summary of Main Findings and Recommendations 



FINDINGS 



1. The time is rapidly nearing when the Soviet Union can possess, 

 first a few, and then a large fleet of intermediate range ballistic missile- 

 launching nuclear-propelled submarines. 



2. The Soviets could mount a devastating nuclear warhead attack 

 from the sea against the United States early in the 1960's. 



3. Our existing defensive system could not stop such a missile 

 attack. 



4. No weapons system now in existence, even on an experimental 

 basis, offers an adequate defense against nonsnorkeling submarines 

 which run quiet and deep. 



5. It is very doubtful whether the present scale and scope of re- 

 search and development in undersea warfare will give us an effective 

 defense against nuclear submarines in time to meet the threat. 



6. Although defense against Polaris-type submarines may soon 

 equal the problem of air defense in urgency, the funding of research 

 and development in support of operational requirements for ASW 

 has been grossly inadequate when compared with the support given 

 such programs as air defense or missile development. 



7. Too little research and development effort in the Navy is now 

 directed toward major or order of magnitude improvements in weapons 

 systems. 



8. Basic scientific research in fields of great concern to undersea 

 warfare but not immediately related to operational requirements has 

 also been inadequately funded. 



9. Basic research in oceanography is in particular now inadequately 

 supported. 



10. There is also urgent need for a major step-up in our program of 

 oceanographic surveys. 



11. The resources of universities, private research centers, and in- 

 dustry have not been adequately employed or developed for studying 

 and solving undersea warfare problems. 



12. The element of concealment gives the nuclear submarine a 

 tremendous advantage over surface ships. Nuclear submarines will 

 grow rapidly in importance in naval warfare — defensively in ASW 

 and escort operations, and offensively in the destruction of commerce 

 and Polaris-type systems. 



13. Assuming no modification of our present and planned sub- 

 marine-construction program, we believe that the Soviets will have 

 it within their capability if they so desire to build a larger nuclear 

 submarine fleet than our own by the mid-1 960 's. 



14. The Polaris system possesses unique advantages as a deterrent 

 force, and it is a matter of national importance that a force of Polaris 

 submarines be brought into being at the earliest possible date. 



15. The Polaris system will be a part of our national military 

 deterrent against all-out war, and should be funded accordingly. It 



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