REPORT OF THE UNDERSEAS WARFARE ADVISORY PANEL 5 



12. A limited number of vertical management organizations, mider 

 officers reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, should 

 be established for such projects as ocean surveillance systems and 

 attack submarine systems. 



II. The Problem 



The oceans of the earth are neutral. 



The}^ take no sides in struggles between men, faiths, and nations. 



Yet for 150 years after the founding of our Kepublic, America 

 regarded the ocean as its ally. In time of peace, the Atlantic and 

 the Pacific insulated us from the quarrels of Em-ope and Asia. In 

 time of war, these sam.e oceans shielded our country against direct 

 enemy attack. They were a vast highway for om- Armed Forces. 

 Over them., men and material were transported to battlefields far 

 removed from our own cities and factories and farm.s. 



But in the First and Second World Wars, the ocean appeared in 

 different guise. We saw it now as our enemy, as well as our friend' 

 Twice, the submarines of Germ.any, sheltered in the depths of the 

 Atlantic, almost defeated the Allied coalition. 



In a future war, the ocean could be our enemy as never before. 



Two new elements have been introduced into naval warfare — the 

 nuclear-propelled submarine, and the submarine-launched intermedi- 

 ate-range ballistic missile. 



An attack by a single Polaris-type submarine, which migiit carry 

 16 or more missiles with hydrogen warheads, could decimate several 

 of our cities. A massive attack with such weapons could level our 

 entire urban society. 



The day is rapidly nearing when the Soviet Union can possess, 

 first a few, and then a large fleet of intermediate-range ballistic missile- 

 launching nuclear-propelled submarmes. 



Our existing and presently planned defensive system could not 

 stop such a missile attack. Therein lies the peril. 



But side by side with this, the ocean can still be our friend, as never 

 before. A fleet of missile-launching nuclear submarines in our own 

 hands could inflict devasting reprisal against an aggressor in the event 

 of all-out war. It could become a mainstaj^ of our national deterrent 

 force. Therein lies the opportunity. 



In this mid-20th century, we therefore face three problems in under- 

 sea warfare. One problem is old ; two are new. 



First, how best to carry out the traditional mission of our Navy? 

 The free-world alliance system is essentially a maritime confederation. 

 Its survival depends on the free transport of materials and people 

 across the oceans and on the control of areas near sea coasts. Today, 

 as in the past, our Navy must still do its traditional job of keeping 

 the oceans open for friendly ships, and bringing superior concentra- 

 tions of power to bear on coastal areas in other regions of the world. 



Second, how best to protect the cities, factories, and military 

 installations of our homeland against a new threat — missile-launching 

 submarines? In a few years, the threat of strategic attack from the 

 sea may equal in danger the threat of attack from land-based manned 

 bombers and intercontinental missiles. 



Third, how best to exploit the new power of submarine-launched 

 missiles to increase our deterrent strength? How best to develop. 



