6 REPORT OF THE UNDERSEAS WARFARE ADVISORY PANEL 



build, supply, maintain, and operate a fleet of nuclear missile-launch- 

 ing submarines. 



III. The Pekil — Today and Tomorrow 



The antisubmarine warfare problem at present centers around 

 detecting, identifying, localizing, and, if necessary, destroying on very 

 short notice the units of an extremely large Soviet conventional sub- 

 marine force consisting of about 475 vessels. 



At the height of World War II, we confronted 440 German U-boats 

 not equipped with schnorkels, with limited underwater endurance, 

 and with an underwater speed not exceeding 12 knots. Operating 

 against this force we had a total of 950 ocean going escorts and 2,200 

 ASWah-craft. 



This compares with about 300 escorts and about 700 ASW aircraft 

 operating today against Soviet submarines of much greater capability. 



Because of the increased capability of the modern submarine, we 

 could not produce or man the number of planes and ships which would 

 be required to defeat these submariiies by the tactics and methods 

 of World War II. We must thus depend heavily on such concepts 

 as ocean surveillance, the barrier or picket concept, and the coordi- 

 nated hunter-killer team with long-range sonar and high mobility 

 aircraft which can carry the battle to the enemy. 



The protection of shipping is of prime importance in a limited war. 

 In such a situation, we ma}" be prevented by policy from attacking 

 the enemy's home submarine bases or his production centers. It 

 follows that the destruction of such bases should not be considered 

 as part of our ASW strategy except in the event of all-out war. 



If all-out war broke out within the next 2 years, the Soviet diesel- 

 electric submarine fleet could inflict very severe damage against allied 

 naval forces and shipping. 



(Classified deletions.) 



We must presume that the Soviets will soon possess nuclear sub- 

 marines which can fire ballistic missiles. The threat from the sea 

 against our cities may assume completely new, and more ominous, 

 dimensions beginning about 1962. 



(Classified deletions.) 



Their capability in this area should increase rapidly thereafter. 



(Classified deletions.) 



Our present main line of surveillance and defense is relatively close 

 to om* own coasts. To counter the threat of missile-launching sub- 

 marines we must develop and maintain secure barriers against them 

 at distances from our coasts greater than the range of their missiles. 

 Only thus can we reestablish the oceans as a protective moat aroimd 

 our shores. 



To summarize: Nuclear-propelled missile-firing subm.arines will be 

 vastly more difficult to destroy than conventional craft — and far more 

 deadly. Furthermore, kill rates which would be tolerable for meeting 

 the threat to shipping would be unacceptably low for countering the 

 underwater missile threat. 



Unless adequate counterroeasures not now in existence become 

 available, the Soviets could mount a devastating nuclear warhead 

 attack from the sea against the cities of the United States early in 

 the 1960's. 



