REPORT OF THE UNDERSEAS WARFARE ADVISORY PANEL 7 



IV. The Opportunity — The Polaris System 



Our Navy is now developing at top priority the Polaris weapoi) 

 system. This system combines the destructive power of nuclear 

 warheads and the hypersonic speed of ballistic delivery vehicles with 

 the endurance and stealth of nuclear-propelled subm.erg-ed launching 

 platforms. 



The superior nature of the Polaris system, should be obvious. 



First, it is relatively immune to sm-prise attack. Units of a Polaris 

 fleet could move and be stationed submerged anywhere over millions 

 of square miles of ocean and still be within striking distance of enemy 

 targets. 



Second, it enormously com.plicates the defensive problem.s of an 

 enemy. It could launch a counterattack against the Soviet Union 

 from, anywhere over an arc of 270 degrees. Vast expenditures of 

 money would be needed to entertain serious hope of neutralizing a 

 Polaris fleet before it could accomplish its mission. Moreover, the 

 relative lack of access of the Soviet Union to the oceans makes their 

 problem of defense against this system, more difficult than ours. 



Third, it would be based on the empty ocean. It would operate 

 hundreds or thousands of mOes removed from the cities, the industries, 

 and the land military installations of our own country and our allies. 

 An enemy attack against a land-based deterrent would draw bombs 

 toward our civilian populations, exposing them to the lethal effects of 

 nuclear weapons, including radioactive fallout. But an attack against 

 units of the Polaris system would not necessarily draw bombs to our 

 heart land. 



Fourth, it could help strengthen the free world alliance system. It 

 would give our allies an alternative to a land-base deterrent force lo- 

 cated in densely populated nations. It would make them better able 

 to resist threats of "ballistic blackmail." 



While not entirely invulnerable, a fleet of Polaris submarines is 

 much less vulnerable than any other foreseeable deterrent system, 

 and could be countered only by a tremendous diversion of research 

 and industrial effort on the part of the enemy. 



It thus adds immensely to our deterrent strength, and it is a matter 

 of national importance that such a fleet be brought into being at the 

 earliest possible date. 



V. Research and Development 



Research and development related to the detection, identification, 

 localization and destruction of submarines has been supported on a 

 much more modest scale than other national defense activities, such 

 as air defense. This is so despite the fact that the defense against 

 the Polaris type submarine may soon be of equal urgency with air 

 defense. 



It requires about 10 years to get a new weapons system into fleet 

 use. Even if this lead tim.e were reduced to 5 years, our situation 

 with respect to undersea warfare would still be serious. There is 

 now no weapons system in existence, even on an experimental basis, 

 capable of coping with a non-snorkeling submarine which runs quiet 

 and deep. 



Underwater research generally is costly, slow, and unglamorous. 

 Consequently it has failed to attract either the financial support or 



