REPORT OF THE UNDERSEAS WARFARE ADVISORY PANEL 1 1 



The real limiting factor in basic research should be the availability 

 of qualified personnel and institutions, not lack of funds. 



We recommend that the Navy's research and development budget 

 for systems immediately relevant to undersea warfare be at least 

 doubled in fiscal year 1959, and substantially and continually in- 

 creased thereafter. 



We recommend that there be a substantial and continuing increase 

 in the Navy's budget for basic research not immediately related to 

 operational requkements. The funding of both basic and applied 

 research should be determined by the availability of qualified scientists 

 and institutions, and should be designed to stimulate the continued 

 orderly growth of universities, private research centers and industries 

 which can contribute to the solution of our long-range problems in 

 underseas warfare. 



We recommend that basic oceanographic research in particular 

 receive increased support. 



We recommend that the appropriate committees of the Congress 

 give serious consideration to increasing the moneys available for 

 oceanographic survey work, both on the high seas and in distant 

 coastal areas. 



We recommend that the Navy, as soon as possible, move to employ 

 far more fully than in the past the resources of universities, private 

 research centers, and industry for carrjnng out both basic and applied 

 research on undersea warfare problems. 



VI. Our Submarine Construction Program 



Of the 110 submarines now in our active fleet, 3 are nuclear powered 

 and the rest are diesel powered. Less than 15 vessels have been built 

 since World War II. 



In contrast, the Soviets have built over 300 submarines since the 

 end of the Second World War, and their force now consists of about 

 475 submarines. 



The element of concealment gives submarines a tremendous ad- 

 vantage over surface ships. As a matter of policy, we should move 

 toward employing submarines for as many naval missions as they can 

 perform. 



It is almost certain that the nuclear submarine will become more 

 and more important in naval warfare — defensively, in ASW and escort 

 operations, and offensively, in attacks on shipping and Polaris-type 

 systems. In addition, the submarine may come to be of great value 

 for close support work in brush fire wars, in remote areas where an 

 enemy might possess local air superiority. 



We regard it as likely that the Soviets can soon have the capability 

 of building many more nuclear submarines than we now plan to con- 

 struct. The record of Soviet performance, both in building conven- 

 tional submarines and in other military-scientific-industrial endeavors, 

 leaves little room for doubt on this score. In fact, assuming a con- 

 tinuation of our present and planned construction program, we regard 

 it as probable that the Soviets will have it within their capability to 

 build a larger nuclear submarine fleet than our own by the mid-1960's. 



Our present building program calls for 13 nuclear-powered attack 

 submarines to be in operation by the end of 1960. Four or five of 

 these could be kept on station at any one time. In 1960, therefore, 



