12 REP0R7: OF THE UNDERSEAS WARFARE ADVISORY PANEL 



we would have only 2 or 3 nuclear attack submarines on station in the 

 Atlantic, and a corresponding number in the Pacific. 



We understand that the Navy now plans to build about 50 addi- 

 tional attack submarines during the decade 1960-70. By an attack 

 submarine, we mean a vessel designed specifically to hunt down and 

 kill enemy submarines. Making allowance for the obsolescence of om- 

 conventional subm.arines, this means that in 1970 there would be in 

 operation about 65 nuclear-powered attack submarines and about 10 

 diesel electric craft. Of this total force, only 12 to 15 submarines 

 could be on station in the Atlantic, with a matching force in the Pacific. 



Keeping the largest possible number of submarines on station is of 

 course a problem of prime importance. We do not believe that our 

 present system of force deployment takes maximum advantage of our 

 subro.arine fleet in this respect, and we m-ge that the Navy intensify 

 its studies of ways and means of keeping a larger proportion of our 

 submarine force on station. 



Quite apart from this, however, we believe that om" present and 

 planned goals for the construction of attack submarines are too small. 



Projected construction goals for Polaris submarines are not j^et firm. 

 We miderstand, however, that the Navy now thinks in terms of 40 

 such submarines being in operation by 1970. 



The eventual size of our Polaris force is a question which will require 

 constant reexamination, in the light of the comparative military worth 

 of the Polaris versus alternative deterrent systems. 



The problem of the ultimate composition of om- Polaris force, 

 however, is not the practical question confronting us today. The real 

 problem at this time is building Polaris submarines in such number 

 and with such speed that we secure as quickly as possible the begin- 

 nings of a sea-based deterrent of significant dimensions. 



It is our understanding that the Navy's immediate plans call for 

 the construction of five Polaris submarines. It is also om* under- 

 standing that the Polaris fleet of the future will consist of multiples 

 of task units of nine submarines each. 



It is our belief that it would be desirable to proceed immediately 

 with the construction of one such complete task unit. 



We recommend that the rate and scale of om- attack submarine 

 construction program, be significantly increased. 



We recommend that the Navy immediately proceed with the 

 construction of an initial task unit of nine Polai'is submarines, and 

 that authorization and appropriations for this purpose be requested 

 of the present session of the Congi'ess. 



VII. Funding for Polaris Submarines 



Funds for constructing Polaris-type submarines will come out of 

 the Navy's regular shipbuilding budget. This appropriation covers 

 the construction of earners, cruisers, frigates, destroyers, tenders, 

 mine sweepers, and all the other vessels employed by our Navy. 



A Polaris-launching submarine is thus treated fiscally like any 

 other naval vessel. In terms of its militai-3^ mission, however, it is 

 radically different from other ships in the fleet. Actually, the Polaris 

 system is part of our national military deterrent against all-out war. 

 It is an instrument of strategic reprisal. It is more analogous to a 

 SAC bomber or a land-based IRBJM or ICBM, than to other ships of 

 our Navy. 



